

# Greed and Social Preferences: How Dispositional Greed Shapes Positional, Absolute, and Egalitarian Choices

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## Abstract

This study examined how dispositional greed relates to individuals' preferences for positional, absolute, and egalitarian outcomes across multiple life domains. Using an extended choice paradigm that allowed for egalitarian options, 137 participants made decisions concerning 11 goods spanning economic, personal, and basic-needs related domains. Overall, higher dispositional greed was associated with a stronger tendency to favor outcomes that maximized personal advantage, either in absolute or relative terms, whereas lower greed was linked to a greater preference for egalitarian outcomes. These effects were descriptively most pronounced in domains carrying strong personal or social significance – such as intelligence, education, and health – particularly when decisions concerned one's child. Economic goods showed weaker but consistent patterns, and preferences for sleep (basic-needs domain) were least sensitive to greed. Importantly, the findings indicate that greed does not promote a single, uniform evaluative orientation; instead, it systematically shifts the balance between absolute, positional, and egalitarian considerations depending on domain meaning. By demonstrating that greed operates as a domain-sensitive motivational disposition whose expression depends on the social meaning of the domain, the study advances theoretical understanding of how individual differences influence distributive judgments and has implications for research on inequality, social comparison, and decision-making across contexts.

**Keywords:** dispositional greed; egalitarian preferences; positional concerns; inequality aversion; absolute preferences.

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## Introduction

Human behavior in the allocation of resources has long been a central focus of psychological and behavioral economic research. How much do people want, and what shapes their preferences? Classical economics assumes that humane preferences for acquiring goods are self-centered and independent of social context. This approach, using the concept of homo economicus, assumes that individuals act out of self-interest and respond to diminishing marginal utility – the principle that additional satisfaction (utility) gained from consuming each extra unit of a good decreases as total consumption increases (Persky, 1995). As a result, the motivation to acquire more goods tends to weaken after reaching certain consumption levels, reflecting diminishing sensitivity to incremental gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

The concept of homo economicus, however, has been widely criticized. People's preferences are often shaped by social comparisons, status, and concerns for fairness, factors that do incorporate others' outcomes into individuals' decision-making processes. In many aspects of life, we compare and compete with those around us, and the notion that people care about their relative position has long been recognized. Veblen's (1899) concept of conspicuous consumption and Duesenberry's (1949) relative income hypothesis suggest that individuals derive utility from status and social rank, not merely from material gain. Frank (1999) further argued that "concern about relative position is a deep-rooted and ineradicable element in human nature" (p. 145). And empirical data shows that such positional concerns ("the extent to which one is concerned about one's status of position in one's reference group" (p. 1, Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2011) are widespread and have been observed in domains ranging from income and education to health and leisure (Solnick & Hemenway, 2005; Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013).

Solnick and Hemenway (1998) examined positional concerns by giving their respondents a choice between two options – different states of the world to live in. One labeled as "positional" – gave participants the advantage over others but was inferior in absolute terms (e.g. income of \$50 000 while others' income is \$25 000) and the other – labeled as "absolute" – was superior from the absolute point of view, but at the same time inferior in the relative perspective (e.g. income of \$100 000 while others' income is \$200 000). What they found was that people were quite positional – their choices were more in line with literature emphasizing importance of comparisons with others than in line with desire for absolutely the best outcome.

However, comparing with others may not lead only to competition, and desire for relative advantage, but also to avoiding inequality, seeking fairness in outcomes. Individuals motivated by equality prefer outcomes that reduce disparities even when this lowers their absolute payoff. In this sense, egalitarian preferences can be viewed as a moral counterweight to status competition (see e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). The motive of inequality aversion is very common and well-documented (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Henrich *et al.*, 2006). However, Solnick and Hemenway's (1998) paradigm did not include an option that would satisfy need for egalitarian solutions. Celse (2012) argued that the strength of positional preferences, as measured by Solnick and Hemenway design, may be artificially overestimated due to ignoring this very strong motive in human choices – inequality aversion. When he added an egalitarian option to the choice set, it turned out that people were much less positional than one would conclude from Solnick and Hemenway (1998).

Understanding when and why individuals adopt one evaluative frame over another remains a vital task. One such factor influencing the strength of positional, absolute and egalitarian preferences is the domain of goods. Some goods such as income, luxury consumption, or career success often elicit positional comparisons, whereas basic or moral goods such as health or safety seem to evoke more absolute or egalitarian judgments (Solnick & Hemenway, 1998; Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013). Health is a particularly interesting domain since some evidence shows that social comparisons do influence how people evaluate their health, several findings suggest that health is valued primarily in absolute rather than relative terms. One reason is that individuals tend to perceive the loss of health as especially costly: as Van Kippersluis and Galama (2014) argue, the “health cost” of losing functional capacity increases with an individual’s life opportunities, making health a fundamentally valued good whose worth is not easily shaped by others’ outcomes. Consistent with this, experimental studies show that respondents discount future health benefits far less steeply than future monetary gains, indicating that health is treated as a more essential and less substitutable asset (Attema *et al.*, 2018). These findings point toward a strong absolute component in health-related preferences. Nevertheless, relative comparisons still meaningfully affect subjective health evaluations. Studies using large survey and panel data demonstrate that individuals’ self-rated health and health satisfaction systematically depend on the health status of their reference group (Carrieri, 2012; Thiel, 2014). Thus, while health tends to be valued in largely absolute terms, social comparison effects remain present, particularly in subjective assessments of well-being.

Another factor influencing positional, absolute and egalitarian concerns is the choice of reference target in status comparisons – specifically, whether individuals evaluate outcomes for themselves or for their children. While foundational work on positional concerns by Solnick and Hemenway (1998) focused primarily on self-referent trade-offs, they also documented that participants make decisions on behalf of others, and in some cases reveal strong relative-position preferences when considering a child’s attributes (Solnick & Hemenway, 1998). Subsequent research has emphasized domain sensitivity in such relative-standing motivations: certain domains such as income or personal traits evoke stronger positional concerns than others (Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013). From a psychosocial perspective, child-referent evaluations may tap into deeply held familial values and intergenerational aspirations that are less filtered through social-desirability constraints than self-evaluations (Liu *et al.*, 2025). Empirical work further suggests that parents’ social comparisons about their children significantly influence both how they view their child’s status and how this, in turn, affects psychological outcomes such as self-esteem (Liu *et al.*, 2025). Thus, child-referent tasks in positional concern research may not simply broaden the measurement but also amplify status motivations by engaging relational and future-oriented concerns. In sum, whether one is asked to evaluate outcomes for “self” versus “child” appears to moderate the weight given to absolute versus relative payoffs, as well as egalitarian considerations (i.e., fair distribution across individuals).

Not surprisingly, personality traits and individual dispositions significantly influence the strength of the discussed preferences. Research has shown that individuals high in extraversion and social dominance orientation are more likely to display strong positional preferences, as they derive satisfaction from outperforming others and maintaining social status (Fischer &

Boer, 2011; Anderson *et al.*, 2015). Conversely, those high in agreeableness and empathy tend to favor egalitarian preferences, emphasizing fairness and equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 1999; Dawes *et al.*, 2007). Meanwhile, conscientious individuals often exhibit stronger absolute preferences, focusing on personal achievement and internal standards rather than social comparison (Judge & Ilies, 2002).

Among various individual characteristics that could shape evaluative orientations greed – “an insatiable desire for more” (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015; Seuntjens *et al.*, 2019) is a trait with profound implications for wide range of decisions yet still quite underexplored. Greed represents a motivational disposition closely tied to self-interest and acquisition. Greedy individuals strive for more even when their needs are already met and may disregard social or moral considerations in pursuit of personal gain. From this perspective greed driven behavior seems to be a good exemplification of homo economicus – self-interest in focus, striving for more. However, as shown by Krekels and Pandelaere (2016) greedy seem to reveal decreased diminishing utility – their valuation of goods does not decrease as their wealth decreases, as it is usually the case.

Recent evidence further suggests that greed does not simply arise from scarcity or deprivation but may develop under conditions of abundance and privilege. Studies indicate that individuals raised in higher socioeconomic contexts or experiencing material security show stronger acquisitive and self-focused motives, consistent with a sense of psychological entitlement (Piff *et al.*, 2010; Kraus *et al.*, 2012). Entitlement – a stable belief that one deserves more than others (Campbell *et al.*, 2004) – appears to provide a cognitive and moral justification for greed. Empirical research demonstrates that dispositional greed correlates positively with entitlement and narcissism, reflecting an inflated sense of deservingness and reduced concern for fairness (Seuntjens *et al.*, 2019).

Conceptually, greed should reduce egalitarian tendencies, as equality limits opportunities for personal accumulation. Yet whether greed aligns more closely with absolute or positional concerns remains unclear. Two possibilities emerge. On one hand, greed might promote absolute preferences, as greedy individuals are primarily focused on increasing their own outcomes regardless of others. Their self-centered motivation may lead them to evaluate gains in absolute rather than relative terms. Moreover, their characteristic insatiability could attenuate the law of diminishing marginal utility, such that each additional gain retains subjective value, a pattern inconsistent with the standard assumption of declining sensitivity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

On the other hand, greed could also enhance positional concerns if the desire for “more” is driven by a quest for dominance or power rather than by pure accumulation. Having more than others confers not only material advantage but also relative status and control. From this perspective, greed could amplify social comparison motives, increasing satisfaction from outperforming others rather than from absolute gains per se.

Empirical evidence on this issue remains scarce. However, recent work by Krekels and Pandelaere (2016) provides initial insights. Across a series of studies, they found that dispositional greed predicts an absolute thinking style: greedy individuals evaluate outcomes in absolute rather than relative terms, show weaker diminishing sensitivity, and display greater insensitivity to contextual anchors. These findings suggest that greed may indeed shift evaluative focus away from positional comparisons toward absolute levels of gain.

## Current study

The present study integrates research on preference formation with work on the psychological consequences of dispositional greed to examine how an insatiable desire for “more” relates to different distributional preference types. Prior research shows that individuals do not evaluate goods solely in absolute terms (in line with the classical view of homo economicus), rather, people evaluate what they have not only in absolute terms but also relative to others, striving either to surpass others or to avoid inequality, giving rise to absolute, positional, and egalitarian preferences. At the same time, studies on dispositional greed indicate that this trait – defined as a persistent, unsatiated desire to acquire more – is associated with selfishness, reduced empathy, and a general disregard for others. Combining these perspectives, I asked whether greed is linked primarily to wanting the maximum possible amount of a good (absolute preferences), to wanting more than others (positional preferences), or simply to avoiding inequality (egalitarian preferences). I examined these associations across three domains: economic goods, personal attributes, and goods tied to basic-needs (health and sleep). Initial chi-square analyses were used as descriptive, exploratory tools, whereas the primary inferential conclusions were based on model-based analyses treating greed as a continuous predictor. The study was partly exploratory, as it remains unclear whether greed amplifies purely maximizing tendencies or positional ones. Nonetheless, I expected that higher greed would be associated with avoiding egalitarian options. Moreover, I anticipated that differences between less and more greedy individuals would emerge primarily in domains that naturally invite social comparison (economic and personal goods), but would diminish in the domain of basic-needs, as individuals typically aim to secure an optimal level of such resources rather than to exceed others or be the same as others.

## Method

### Participants

A total of 152 participants were recruited for the study. After applying attention checks the final sample consisted of 137 participants (63.5% female;  $M_{age} = 28.6$  years,  $SD = 8.9$ )<sup>2</sup>. Participants were recruited via online research platform Answeo and compensated for their time. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation.

### Design and Procedure

The study employed a within-subjects experimental design. Each participant was presented with a series of 11 choices, each corresponding to a distinct life domain. The domains included economics (e.g., income, savings), personal (e.g., education, intelligence), and basic-needs

<sup>2</sup> An ex-post power analysis conducted using \*G\*Power\* 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) for a chi-square test comparing three groups across three choice categories ( $\alpha = .05$ ;  $w = .30$ ; Cohen, 1988) indicated that the obtained sample ( $N = 137$ ) provided a power of .82. This suggests that the study was adequately powered to detect effects of medium size.

goods (e.g., health, sleep). In case of personal and well-being domains, choices concerned oneself and one's child.

In each domain, participants were asked to imagine hypothetical "states of the world" and to select one of three possible outcomes:

- Option A (Positional choice): The participant would have *more than others* but *less in absolute terms*.
- Option B (Absolute choice): The participant would have *less than others* but *more in absolute terms*.
- Option C (Egalitarian choice): The participant would have *the same as others*, corresponding to equality in outcomes (i.e., equivalent in absolute terms to the positional option).

This framework, based on Solnick and Hemenway's (1998) method for eliciting positional concerns, was extended here to include an egalitarian option to capture inequality aversion (see: Celse, 2012). Participants were instructed to treat each domain independently and to respond according to their personal preference, not what they believed to be socially desirable.

## Measures

### Dispositional Greed

Individual differences in greed were measured using the Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS) developed by Seuntjens *et al.* (2015). The scale consists of seven items (e.g., "I always want more than I already have"), rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Items were averaged to form a composite greed score, with higher scores indicating greater dispositional greed. The scale demonstrated good internal consistency in this study (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .88$ ).

### Choice Preferences

For each of the 11 goods, the participant's selection (positional, absolute, or egalitarian) was recorded. Frequencies of each choice type were analyzed grouped in three domains: Economic (income, investment and savings), Personal (appearance, intelligence and education - own and one's child's), and Basic-needs domain (sleep and health - own and one's child's).

## Results

To provide an initial descriptive overview of how dispositional greed relates to social preference structures, I first examined the distribution of egalitarian, absolute, and positional choices across greed groups using chi-square analyses. These analyses were conducted separately for economic goods, basic-needs, and personal goods.

Across domains, the chi-square analyses revealed systematic associations between dispositional greed and choice distributions. In general, lower greed was associated with a higher frequency of egalitarian choices, whereas higher greed was linked to more frequent selection of self-advantaging outcomes, both absolute and positional. However, the strength and con-

sistency of these patterns varied across domains. Associations were weakest for economic goods, more pronounced for basic-needs goods (except sleep), and most consistent for personal goods, particularly in decisions involving child-related outcomes.

Importantly, the direction and magnitude of these associations differed across individual goods within domains, suggesting that dispositional greed is linked to domain-dependent shifts in social preference structures rather than a uniform reduction in egalitarianism. Detailed contingency tables and domain-specific choice distributions are reported in the Appendix (Tables A1–A3; Figures A1–A3).

The above analyses are descriptive in nature, rely on discretized greed groups, and do not account for the repeated-measures structure of the data. Accordingly, they should be interpreted as exploratory and illustrative rather than as confirmatory evidence. Since these results are interpreted as descriptive groundwork rather than confirmatory evidence, the following section therefore turns to a Bayesian multinomial mixed-effects model, which allows for simultaneous modeling of choices across aggregated domains while accounting for within-person dependencies and providing a more rigorous test of the relationship between dispositional greed and social preferences. Such analytic approach allows the three mutually exclusive choice options to be modeled simultaneously while accounting for the repeated-measures structure of the data, as each participant made multiple decisions across domains. Dispositional greed was entered as a standardized continuous predictor. To capture theoretically meaningful differences between types of goods, individual choice tasks were grouped into three aggregated domain categories: economic, personal, and basic-needs goods, with economic goods serving as the reference domain. Because each participant made multiple decisions across domains, subject-level random intercepts were included for each non-baseline outcome category to account for within-person dependencies.

Models were estimated using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling as implemented in the *brms* package in R. Sampling was performed using 8 parallel Markov chains, each run for 4,500 iterations, including 500 warm-up iterations. This yielded a total of 32,000 post-warm-up posterior samples. Weakly informative default priors were used. Population-level regression coefficients were assigned flat (improper uniform) priors, intercept terms were assigned Student- $t(3, 0, 2.5)$  priors, and standard deviations of subject-level random intercepts were assigned half-Student- $t(3, 0, 2.5)$  priors. This prior structure constrains parameters to plausible ranges while allowing the data to dominate posterior inference. Posterior summaries are reported as posterior means ( $b$ ) with 95% credible intervals (CrI). Model convergence was assessed using R-hat statistics and effective sample sizes; all parameters showed satisfactory convergence ( $R_{\text{hat}} \approx 1.00$ ).

The primary analyses focus on an additive model including main effects of dispositional greed and domain category (Model 1). To assess whether the association between greed and choice preferences differed across domains, an alternative model including interactions between greed and domain group was also estimated (Model 2).

Model comparison using both Bayes factors and leave-one-out cross-validation favored the simpler additive model. The estimated Bayes factor in favor of the interaction model over the additive model was 0.06, indicating strong evidence against the more complex specification. Consistent with this conclusion, leave-one-out cross-validation showed no meaningful improvement in predictive accuracy for the interaction model ( $\Delta\text{ELPD} = -0.4$ ,

SE = 3.2). In addition, posterior estimates for all interaction terms were centered near zero with wide credible intervals. Accordingly, the additive model was retained as the primary model, indicating that dispositional greed exerts a broadly similar influence on preference structures across domains, with no reliable evidence for domain-specific moderation of greed-related shifts.

Across domains, higher levels of dispositional greed were associated with a systematic shift away from egalitarian choices. As shown in Table 1, increases in greed predicted a higher likelihood of choosing both absolute ( $b = 0.43$ , 95% CrI [0.17, 0.69]) and positional ( $b = 0.55$ , 95% CrI [0.27, 0.85]) options relative to egalitarian ones.

The posterior contrast between positional and absolute outcomes was comparatively small and uncertain, indicating that greed primarily operates by eroding egalitarian preferences rather than by consistently favoring relative over absolute advantage. In other words, higher greed reallocates choice probability away from equality toward self-advantaging outcomes in general, without strongly discriminating between absolute and positional gains.

Baseline preference structures differed across domains. Relative to economic goods, basic-needs goods were associated with a higher likelihood of absolute choices but a lower likelihood of positional choices, reflecting the dominant role of absolute considerations in domains such as health and sleep. Preferences for personal goods did not differ reliably from economic goods in the absolute contrast but showed a modest reduction in positional preferences.

The model included subject-level random intercepts for each non-baseline outcome category, capturing residual individual differences in baseline choice tendencies after accounting for greed and domain category. Posterior estimates indicated substantial heterogeneity across participants. The standard deviation of random intercepts was 1.26 (95% CrI [1.01, 1.55]) for the absolute versus egalitarian contrast and 1.36 (95% CrI [1.09, 1.67]) for the positional versus egalitarian contrast. These values indicate pronounced between-person variability in baseline propensities to favor non-egalitarian options.

**TABLE 1.** Effects of dispositional greed on choice preferences: Bayesian multinomial mixed-effects model


Predictor	<i>b</i>	95% CrI
<b>Absolute vs. Egalitarian</b>		
Intercept	-0.61	[-0.96, -0.26]
Greed ( <i>z</i> )	0.43	[0.17, 0.69]
Basic-needs (vs. economic)	0.92	[0.55, 1.29]
Personal (vs. economic)	-0.22	[-0.58, 0.13]
<b>Positional vs. Egalitarian</b>		
Intercept	-0.24	[-0.60, 0.11]
Greed ( <i>z</i> )	0.55	[0.27, 0.85]
Basic-needs (vs. economic)	-0.77	[-1.19, -0.37]
Personal (vs. economic)	-0.34	[-0.67, -0.01]

Note. Coefficients are posterior means (*b*) from a Bayesian multinomial mixed-effects model with egalitarian choices as the reference category. Values in brackets indicate 95% credible intervals.

Source:

Figure 1 displays model-predicted probabilities of choosing egalitarian, absolute, and positional options as a function of standardized dispositional greed, shown separately for economic, personal, and basic-needs goods. Predictions represent population-level effects, with subject-level random effects set to zero.

FIGURE 1. Model-predicted choice probabilities



Source:

Across all domains, increasing greed was associated with a monotonic decline in the probability of egalitarian choices and corresponding increases in self-advantaging options. While this general pattern was consistent, baseline preference structures differed across domains. In the basic-needs domain, absolute choices dominated across the greed spectrum, whereas positional choices remained comparatively rare. In contrast, in economic and personal domains, positional choices increased more sharply with greed, reflecting the greater relevance of relative standing in these contexts. The figure thus visually corroborates the regression results by illustrating how dispositional greed redistributes choice probabilities away from equality toward absolute and positional outcomes, while preserving domain-specific baseline differences.

Taken together, the results indicate that dispositional greed is systematically associated with social preference structures. Higher greed reliably predicts reduced egalitarian preferences and increased likelihood of self-advantaging choices across domains. This effect is robust, domain-general, and driven primarily by erosion of equality-oriented considerations rather than by a selective amplification of positional over absolute motives.

At the same time, the findings underscore the importance of domain context. Goods tied to basic-needs are evaluated predominantly in absolute terms, whereas economic and personal goods are more sensitive to relative comparisons. Greed thus operates as a domain-sensitive motivational disposition that reshapes the balance between egalitarian, absolute, and positional considerations without fundamentally altering the structure of domain differences.

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## Discussion

The present study examined how dispositional greed relates to preferences for positional, absolute, and egalitarian outcomes across a diverse set of life domains. By integrating an extended choice paradigm with individual-differences measures, the study offers several contributions to the literature on greed and social preferences.

First, the findings demonstrate that greed is systematically associated with how individuals evaluate distributive outcomes. Across domains, higher levels of greed were linked to a reduced likelihood of choosing egalitarian options and a greater tendency to favor self-focused outcomes. This pattern is consistent with conceptualizations of greed as an acquisitive motivational disposition that prioritizes personal advantage while downplaying concerns for equality and fairness (Seuntjens *et al.*, 2015).

Second, the results clarify an important theoretical ambiguity regarding the nature of greed-related preferences. Greed did not promote a single, uniform evaluative orientation. Instead, increases in greed primarily displaced egalitarian considerations, with the resulting shift directed toward self-advantaging outcomes in general, rather than reflecting a selective amplification of positional over absolute motives. This suggests that greed is not merely about having more, but about having more relative to others, especially when egalitarian constraints are weakened. Moreover, domain-level analyses indicate that the expression of greed depends on the social meaning of the good under consideration. Greed-related effects were most pronounced in domains that are socially salient, identity-relevant, or tied to future opportunities - such as intelligence, education, and health - particularly when decisions concerned one's child. This pattern aligns with prior work suggesting that social comparison motives are especially strong in domains linked to status, competence, and intergenerational concerns (Bogaerts & Pandelaere, 2013; Liu *et al.*, 2025). Still, these domain-specific patterns were most evident in the descriptive analyses, whereas the mixed-effects model indicated that the overall association between greed and preference shifts was broadly similar across aggregated domains.

At the same time, the findings indicate that some domains are characterized by baseline preference patterns that are relatively less sensitive to variation in dispositional greed. Preferences for sleep showed minimal differentiation across greed levels, suggesting that goods with low social comparability and limited symbolic value may be relatively insulated from greed-driven evaluation. This reinforces the view that greed exerts its strongest influence when outcomes can be readily translated into social advantage or status.

Taken together, the results suggest that greed is best understood as a domain-sensitive motivational disposition that systematically reshapes the balance between egalitarian, absolute, and positional considerations. Rather than promoting a uniform maximizing tendency, greed appears to erode equality motives and amplify relative-evaluation processes in contexts where such evaluations are meaningful.

Several limitations warrant caution. Exploratory design means that results should not be interpreted as confirmatory. The sample size, although adequate for chi-square analyses, limits the detection of subtle effects, and some significant findings may reflect chance variation.

Despite these limitations, the study contributes to emerging literature by showing that greed systematically shapes social preference structures across multiple life domains, though with varying strength. The findings highlight the need for domain-sensitive models of greed and suggest fruitful directions for future work, including investigations of mediating processes (e.g., social comparison sensitivity, competitive mindset, entitlement) and potential moderators such as socioeconomic status or cultural norms regarding equity.

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## APPENDIX

The Appendix provides descriptive chi-square analyses to document domain-specific choice distributions. These analyses are intended as supplementary context for the model-based results reported in the main text.

**TABLE A1.** Observed, Expected Frequencies, and Adjusted Residuals for Choice Option by Greed Level Across Three Goods

Good / Option	Low Greed	Medium Greed	High Greed	$\chi^2$ (df)	p (Cramer's V)	$\chi^2$ (df) low vs. high	p (Cramer's V)
<b>Income</b>				8.67 (4)	.070 (.16)	6.71 (2)	.035 (.28)
Positional	O = 21 E = 19.0 AR = 0.88	O = 15 E = 18.3 AR = -0.99	O = 15 E = 13.7 AR = 0.68				
Absolute	O = 6 E = 11.9 AR = -2.08*	O = 14 E = 11.5 AR = 0.97	O = 12 E = 9.5 AR = 0.96				
Egalitarian	O = 24 E = 20.1 AR = 1.38	O = 20 E = 19.3 AR = 0.18	O = 10 E = 15.7 AR = -1.74				
<b>Investment</b>				6.94 (4)	.139 (.15)	7.10 (2)	.029 (.28)
Positional	O = 10 E = 15.6 AR = -1.88	O = 17 E = 15.0 AR = 0.49	O = 15 E = 11.3 AR = 1.40				
Absolute	O = 12 E = 12.2 AR = -0.05	O = 10 E = 11.7 AR = -0.49	O = 11 E = 9.1 AR = 0.61				
Egalitarian	O = 29 E = 23.3 AR = 1.72	O = 22 E = 22.3 AR = -0.06	O = 11 E = 17.6 AR = -1.84				
<b>Savings</b>				10.98 (4)	.027 (.20)	8.67 (2)	.013 (.31)
Positional	O = 10 E = 18.3 AR = -2.20*	O = 24 E = 17.9 AR = 1.83	O = 17 E = 14.0 AR = 0.92				
Absolute	O = 17 E = 14.0 AR = 0.94	O = 10 E = 13.7 AR = -1.05	O = 12 E = 10.7 AR = 0.61				
Egalitarian	O = 24 E = 18.4 AR = 1.80	O = 15 E = 18.0 AR = -1.00	O = 8 E = 13.3 AR = -1.79				

Note. O = observed frequency; E = expected frequency; AR = adjusted residual. Expected frequencies indicate counts expected under independence between greed level and choice. Adjusted residuals reflect standardized deviations between observed and expected frequencies; |AR| > 1.96 indicates  $p < .05$ .

Source: own elaboration.

**TABLE A2.** Observed, Expected Frequencies, and Adjusted Residuals for Choice Option by Greed Level Across Five Goods

Good / Option	Low Greed	Medium Greed	High Greed	$\chi^2$ (df)	p (Cramer's V)	$\chi^2$ (df) low vs. high	p (Cramer's V)
<b>Appearance</b>				12.37 (4)	.015 (.21)	6.86 (2)	.032 (.28)
Positional	O = 19 E = 16.4 AR = 0.92	O = 8 E = 15.8 AR = -2.13*	O = 17 E = 11.9 AR = 1.89				
Absolute	O = 8 E = 10.8 AR = -0.92	O = 9 E = 10.3 AR = -0.41	O = 12 E = 7.7 AR = 1.79				
Egalitarian	O = 24 E = 23.8 AR = 0.07	O = 32 E = 22.9 AR = 2.29*	O = 8 E = 17.3 AR = -2.40*				

<b>Own intelligence</b>				8.94 (4)	.062 (.18)	10.20 (2)	.006 (.34)
Positional	O = 19 E = 19.7 AR = -0.25	O = 20 E = 18.9 AR = 0.30	O = 14 E = 14.4 AR = -0.13				
Absolute	O = 4 E = 8.9 AR = -1.76	O = 8 E = 8.6 AR = -0.20	O = 12 E = 6.8 AR = 2.09*				
Egalitarian	O = 28 E = 22.4 AR = 1.47	O = 21 E = 21.4 AR = -0.09	O = 11 E = 16.9 AR = -1.64				
<b>Own education</b>				7.10 (4)	.131 (.15)	5.58 (2)	.061 (.25)
Positional	O = 7 E = 8.9 AR = -0.61	O = 10 E = 8.6 AR = 0.42	O = 7 E = 6.5 AR = 0.30				
Absolute	O = 16 E = 19.7 AR = -1.05	O = 18 E = 18.0 AR = 0.09	O = 19 E = 13.6 AR = 1.71				
Egalitarian	O = 28 E = 22.4 AR = 1.32	O = 21 E = 21.4 AR = -0.09	O = 11 E = 16.9 AR = -1.63				
<b>Child's intel- ligence</b>				9.38 (4)	.052 (.18)	8.78 (2)	.012 (.32)
Positional	O = 17 E = 21.2 AR = -1.11	O = 22 E = 20.3 AR = 0.38	O = 18 E = 15.4 AR = 0.85				
Absolute	O = 6 E = 7.8 AR = -0.78	O = 5 E = 7.5 AR = -1.00	O = 10 E = 5.7 AR = 2.01*				
Egalitarian	O = 28 E = 22.0 AR = 1.33	O = 22 E = 21.1 AR = 0.21	O = 9 E = 16.0 AR = -2.00*				
<b>Child's education</b>				11.68 (4)	.020 (.20)	12.73 (2)	.002 (.38)
Positional	O = 6 E = 12.3 AR = -1.87	O = 15 E = 11.7 AR = 1.06	O = 12 E = 8.8 AR = 1.19				
Absolute	O = 12 E = 14.2 AR = -0.64	O = 11 E = 13.5 AR = -0.71	O = 15 E = 10.1 AR = 1.86				
Egalitarian	O = 33 E = 24.5 AR = 1.97*	O = 23 E = 23.3 AR = -0.07	O = 10 E = 17.4 AR = -2.00*				

Note. O = observed frequency; E = expected frequency; AR = adjusted residual. Expected frequencies indicate counts expected under independence between greed level and choice. Adjusted residuals reflect standardized deviations between observed and expected frequencies; |AR| > 1.96 indicates  $p < .05$ .

Source: own elaboration.

**TABLE A3.** Observed, Expected Frequencies, and Adjusted Residuals for Choice Option by Greed Level Across Basic-needs domain (Health and Sleep)


Good / Option	Low Greed	Medium Greed	High Greed	$\chi^2$ (df)	p (Cramer's V)	$\chi^2$ (df) low vs. high	p (Cramer's V)
<b>Own health</b>				9.62 (4)	.047 (.18)	10.49 (2)	.005 (.35)
Positional	O = 4 E = 9.3 AR = -1.95	O = 9 E = 8.9 AR = 0.09	O = 12 E = 6.8 AR = 2.02*				
Absolute	O = 24 E = 21.6 AR = 0.63	O = 17 E = 20.7 AR = -0.90	O = 17 E = 15.7 AR = 0.46				
Egalitarian	O = 23 E = 20.1 AR = 0.67	O = 23 E = 19.4 AR = 0.95	O = 8 E = 14.7 AR = -2.06*				

<b>Child's health</b>			11.12 (4)	.025 (.20)	5.54 (2)	.063 (.35)
Positional	O = 6 E = 10.4 AR = -1.42	O = 16 E = 10.0 AR = 1.93	O = 6 E = 7.6 AR = -0.61			
Absolute	O = 20 E = 19.6 AR = 0.10	O = 11 E = 18.7 AR = -1.98*	O = 22 E = 14.3 AR = 2.04*			
Egalitarian	O = 25 E = 21.0 AR = 0.88	O = 22 E = 20.0 AR = 0.46	O = 9 E = 15.3 AR = -1.90			
<b>Sleep</b>			8.28 (4)	.082 (.17)	1.56	.457 (.13)
Positional	O = 4 E = 7.1 AR = -1.22	O = 10 E = 6.9 AR = 1.25	O = 6 E = 5.2 AR = 0.45			
Absolute	O = 32 E = 28.4 AR = 0.90	O = 26 E = 27.7 AR = -0.38	O = 22 E = 20.9 AR = 0.32			
Egalitarian	O = 15 E = 15.5 AR = -0.16	O = 13 E = 15.1 AR = -0.56	O = 9 E = 11.4 AR = -0.82			

Note. O = observed frequency; E = expected frequency; AR = adjusted residual.


Source: own elaboration.

FIGURE A1. Distributions of choices of three groups of participants in economic domain




Source: own elaboration.

FIGURE A2. Distributions of choices of three groups of participants in the domain of personal goods



Source: own elaboration.

FIGURE A3. Distributions of choices of three groups of participants in the domain of basic-needs goods



Source: own elaboration.