

National Security and Defense after the Second World War of Japan



THE DRASTIC TRANSFORMATION FROM A MILITANT STATE TO A PEACE LOVING COUNTRY

As the result of the unconditional surrender of the Second World War Japan was changed in a revolutionary manner. According to the conditions defined by the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 Japan was completely de-militarized and her territories were limited mainly to four islands including of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido. Most of the other territories like Taiwan (Formosa), Korea and the other small islands, which were taken as the results of wars and then administrated by the Japanese Authorities, were to be returned to the former ethnic authorities.

These procedures had to be decided later by the Allied Powers. All the Japanese Imperial Forces, which at the highest point in 1945 were composed of divisions comprising seven millions uniformed soldiers, were disarmed and ordered to resolve at once by a single order of the Emperor on the 15th of August¹. Although there were some problems concerning the repatriation of military forces stationed abroad, namely about three and half millions of the surrendered soldiers, their repatriation process had to be followed soon, but it took in fact a long time (because the problem was also associated with the evacuation of about 3 millions civilians

¹ Emperor was not a state organ which could make decision of any kinds. The radio speech of Emperor was the first public appearance by voice, which meant an expression of the highest will of Imperial Japan. So, it should be treated as a final decision on the surrender.





who settled abroad during the last half century). While the repatriation from the Pacific and the South East Asian area were fulfilled according to the agreements, except for some officers arrested to be accused of war crimes, the repatriation from the Soviet Union, or to say correctly, from the North-Eastern part of China, made desperate socio-political problems home. The Japanese troops (the former Kantogun), roughly divisions composed of 600,000 soldiers stationed in Manchuria, were disarmed by the Occupation Forces of Soviet Army. After that, instead of repatriation to Japan, they were all transferred from there to the Soviet concentration camps in Siberia and forced to work for some years, some of them until the middle of the 1950s. It is reported by the Japanese sources that 62,000 of them had never returned home, and probably they perished there due to the severe environment of the concentration camps. While the repatriation process of the remaining half a million soldiers who fortunately survived, had been fulfilled during 1950–55 after roughly 5–10 years of the *de facto* ceasefire by the Emperor's radio speech on August 15th, 1945, concerning the tragic issue on the concentration camps, even a single official research in detail has not been permitted by the Soviet side. Many years later, during the Gorbachov administration in 1986, the Soviet Authorities had first recognized the fact that 46,000 of Japanese soldiers, whose names were known, were buried in Siberia. The Japanese side reported it differently – there were more lost personals². In addition, the then first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Gorbachov made a gesture of apology for the tragedy by visiting a cemetery in Khabalovsk, where some of the Japanese soldiers were buried.

The Soviet attitude towards Japan was in principle different from the other members of the Allied Powers since the beginning of the surrender ceasefire. The Soviet authorities had not admitted the ceasefire of Japan on August 15, 1945 and then, ordered their troops to land the Northern islands, the Kurile Islands on September 2, 1945, already after the end of the War and declared officially that those islands became parts of the Soviet territories and soon integrated them into the Soviet administration³. Those are complicated issues of politics and law at the time of the Stalinist Soviet

² John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat; Japan in the Wake of World War*, New York, 1999, p. 51–52.

³ Though Japan–Soviet relations were kept peaceful based on the treaty of neutrality concluded on April, 1941 for 5 years until almost end of the war, Soviet declared war against Japan on 9th August 1945. While US military actions stopped on August 15th, Soviet command ordered to land on the Kuriles at the same time, and the landing of Soviet army started on August 18th, 1945. Soon after that, Soviet authorities declared it as a new Soviet territories. Since then, the situation has not been changed.





Union, and due to these reasons the peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union (Russia, today) has not yet been concluded⁴.

After the surrender signed on 2nd September 1945 in Tokyo, Japan was officially under the occupation of the Allied Powers. Under the occupation of the Allied Powers, namely United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, Australia, Holland, China and the others, Japan entered for the first time in her history into the status of the protected by foreign authorities. The people were in shock by the facts of surrender, total devastation of land and despair as a result of the war, which was continuously kept for some years just after the War. Although the government of Japan formally existed, the *de facto* administrative power on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration was implemented by the Occupation Authorities (SCAP), mainly the government of the USA. One of the purposes of the occupation policies toward Japan was to build a peace country which could never be involved in any military conflicts in Asia and the Pacific region. It was indeed realized as a constitutional principle in the article nine of the constitution of 1946, which was enacted during the occupation period. Accordingly, Japan became the first country in the world which had absolutely denounced war.

Under the completely destructed situation the people, different in mood from the victorious stage of revolution, accepted passively the new political system almost without discussions at the beginning, which was proposed by the government under the dominant influences of the occupation authorities. Soon after the proclamation, however, it became changed by the mood of appreciation of the constitution. Because the absolute pacifism has been realized as the article nine, all administrative orders relating to the militarism before, including of the ministries of interior, army, navy and the conscription system was totally abolished. That is a reason why the principle of absolute pacifism had prevailed quickly and deeply among the people. Indeed this is a key to understand psychologically the people survived from the War⁵.

The conscription system was first adopted at the end of the 19th century (1873) when preparing for war against China. With successful expansion policy particularly since the War with Russia in 1905, the military

⁴ There were several times of the official meetings concerning on peace treaty by solving territorial issues, but no concrete results.

⁵ Since Japan was for the first time totally devastated under the heavily oppressed social control during the war, the people was deeply suffered from a half sickness like mental disorder.





authorities instead of civil administrators had taken the control of it, and all the people over 20 years were subjected to strict application of the conscription law.

Since the 1930s, due to the military operations expanded to the Chinese Continent, shortage of military personnel became a serious problem for the military authorities and in order to respond to the demands, the conscription was broadly propagated. It was characterized by the fact that, differently from pure national defense purpose which was partly realized as voluntary system, new soldiers summoned by conscription were always expected to be sent abroad no matter what to extend, and they were trained accordingly.

In particular with the increase of human loss due to the outbreak of the Pacific War a large number of young people, disregarding social position, profession and privilege, were summoned by conscription system and after a short term training they were sent to the scattered fronts of the Pacific War as a piece of military supplements, which reached the highest level accounted by 7 million soldiers in 1945⁶.

Therefore, the post-war generation had indeed appreciated the fact that the constitutional pacifism had liberated them from the psychological threat caused by harsh conscription rooted in mind⁷.

That is one of the differences of social consciousness on the conscription in comparison with that in Germany, where the government (yet as GFR) had enacted a law on conscription at the time of entry to NATO in 1955. In contrast, there have never been this kind of political debates in Japan. Even those who see favorably the building of military capability of SDF have not yet accepted it and, at least seems to be reluctant about the restoration of conscription⁸.

⁶ The conscription law was often amended since 1933. According to the last one in 1941, even students, whose academic years were specially shortened, were subjected to the law. In addition, men aged between 17 and 45 were also subjected to the law of 1945. As a result, roughly 40% of the male population at the time were summoned and forced to enter military forces either army or navy. Most of them were trained for a very short period, so unskilled and poorly qualified, they were soon sent to the fronts.

Numbers of the summoned soldiers (1000 person)							
1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
1,325	1,420	1,573	2,411	2,829	3,608	5,395	7,165

Source: Ohe Shinobu, *Choheisei* (conscription), Tokyo, 1981.

⁷ After the war those tragic histories were introduced by popular writers and the truth about the war became better known among the people. See, John W. Dower, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁸ Ohe Shinobu, *Choheisei* (conscription), *op. cit.*





2

**THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF JAPAN ARRANGED
BY THE JAPAN–USA MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1951**

Thus, from strategic point of view, Japan was disarmed and peaceful but completely naked without defense facilities. At the time of the end of occupation by the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 debates on security of Japan became a focused issue among the concerned countries.

From the conventional understanding on international law all the occupation authorities including the military forces should withdraw from the occupied territories after concluding the peace treaty, but the allied powers, especially the United States, could not leave Japan isolated or neutral or being free of her own strategic choice. Because of the fact that it was just the hottest time in the Cold War, Japan's strategic position in Asia became inevitably important for the West, particularly since the Outbreak of Korean War in 1950. Strategically, the Allied powers operating in Korea as a unified UN forces according to the UN Security Council's decision, wished to continue to station at the military bases in Japan.

During the drafting of peace treaty the main drafting side, the government of the USA, proposed an idea of a mutual security treaty with Japan as a part of the security policies in Asia, which was later accepted by the Japanese Government. On the same day of the signing of the peace treaty on September 8, 1951, a treaty of Mutual Security was signed between Japan and US.

According to the provisions of the treaty, the Japanese government would continue to guarantee to the United States the right to station military forces in Japan; the United States, for its part, promised to protect Japan militarily from the threat of both domestic insurrection and foreign attack. In addition, the Japanese government agreed that it would not allow any third country to use Japanese territory for the development of military forces without the consent of the United States. In this way, the security relations between Japan and US, and also the US strategic position in Asia, were guaranteed⁹.

At the end of the 1950s, at the negotiation on foreseeable extension of the treaty, the United States, taking the continuous tension in Asia into

⁹ James E. Auer, *Article Nine; Renunciation of War*, in: *Japanese Constitutional Law*, ed. by P.R. Luney Jr, and K. Takahashi, Tokyo, 1993, p. 69.





consideration, pressed Japan to build a military capability appropriate for an ally with whom the United States could build a truly mutual security arrangement. Thus, an entirely new Japan–US Mutual Security Treaty was concluded in January 1960, replacing the previous treaty of 1951. However, the nation-wide opposition movements were provoked, which protested against the ratification of the treaty. That was the reason why since the 1960s the public opinion on security issues has become very much sensitive not only in parliament but also in public¹⁰.

A new US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, was, after long debates, finally ratified and went into effect on June 23, 1960. The new treaty was a completely new document. Although under the previous treaty, the United States exercised virtually unlimited rights to use US bases in Japan for whatever purposes the United States desired, under the new treaty, in case of an attack, the United States and Japan were to consult one another; a more explicit commitment on the parts of both countries. Moreover, the treaty (article V) qualified US base rights for use in defending Japan, and in addition, the article VI qualified US base rights for use in preserving the peace and security of East Asia. The Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty of 1960 was automatically extended according to the provisions, successively in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000¹¹.

3

ABSOLUTE PACIFISM OF THE CONSTITUTION IN 1946 AND ITS FLEXIBLE INTERPRETATION

Despite the constitutional declaration on absolute pacifism (Article 9), there were paradoxical realities concerning international circumstances that developed soon after the promulgation in 1946.

The absolute pacifism which banned Japanese army, navy and air force for any purpose, was a policy of the Allied Powers from the beginning of the Occupation.

¹⁰ "ANNPO TOSO" (Anti-Japan–US Security Treaty Movement) was first started by students, but gradually it has prevailed among trade union workers. The Socialist Party.

¹¹ The unconstitutionality of the treaty was once questioned by the Supreme court (the Sunagawa case). However, the supreme court avoided to judge on legality of war potential through international arrangement. (Dec. 16, 1959).





At the drafting of the Constitution, Hidehara, the then prime minister, who was well known as a pacifist before the war, agreed with General MacArthur on the content of the article nine. Historically to say the genesis of pacifism was formally concluded as the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, which most of the leading states, including Japan, had ratified, but it could not prevent the Second World War from the outbreak. Japanese Constitution of 1946 was the first constitution of this kind, which has definitely declared that war is outlawed, which was realized in the article nine of the constitution as follows¹²:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as a means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of proceeding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

However, political interpretation of the article nine has depended on Japan's international circumstances due to the Cold War in Asia and on changes of international demands. First, soon after the promulgation of the constitution, the Cold War turned to be hot followed by the Outbreak of the Korean War. The Occupation Authorities ordered, taking the emergent situation into consideration, Japan to form the 75,000 man National Force Reserve in 1950, which later became Self Defense Forces with arms in 1954. At the time the SCAP (the Allied Powers) and its Commander in chief D. MacArthur elaborated an idea that Japan's pacifism declared by the Constitution has not denounced the means of self-defense as a sovereign right, particularly in terms of international law. The government of Japan also tried to reserve the stance to be flexible concerning the interpretation of the article nine¹³.

Looking back at the history of the article nine it is said that Japan has responded, to some extent, to military development which was asked for by the Allied Powers, particularly by the USA, but at the same time it has attempted to live up to the ideals of the pacifism declared by the Constitution of 1946 in Practice.

¹² Teruji Suzuki, *Constitutionalism in Japan*, "Master of Business Administration", 1(90) Styczeń–Luty, 2008, s. 12.

¹³ *Ibidem*.





In 1955 the official cabinet policy statement on article 9 was a little expanded:

“The constitution, while denouncing war, has not denounced war for self defense. To check armed attack in event of such an attack from outside is self defense itself, and is entirely different from settling international disputes. Hence, the case of military power as a means of defending the nation when the nation has been attacked by military power is not counter to the Constitution.”

However, the cabinet of LDP, based on the parliamentary declaration of 1967 announced the three so-called non-nuclear principles, whereby Japan pledged not to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons and not to allow nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan. Besides, a principia on budgetary limit were also declared, whereby the amount equivalent to 1 % of the Japan’s GDP can at most be allocated to the formally established SDF. The principle has been maintained in practice since then. It is true that, taking the fact of the expanded GDP of Japan as a economic super power (second to the USA in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s, until 2006) into consideration, the amount of military expenditure within the one % of GDP has also grown and the military expenditure for weapons and the military equipments is comparable to those of the leading countries, and in fact it became large, being located as one of the first in the ranking of national expenditures in defense; following USA, Russia, China, Israel¹⁴.

It is Today’s SDF¹⁵:

The Maritime Self Defense Force has more destroyer-type vessels than the British Royal Navy. The Air Self Defense Force has more than 300 fighter aircraft, and 100 sophisticated P3C antisubmarine aircraft. In addition, 200 of the most modern fighter aircraft, F15, and a large number of sophisticated Patriot air defense missiles. As a result, under such advanced warfare capability it is indeed difficult for ships and aircraft to enter the Sea of Japan or the Pacific Ocean without being detected by SDF.

With the growing role of international cooperation within the United Nations, Japan’s absolute prohibition on dispatches of military forces abroad was questioned and finally a special bill had to be introduced, called “the UN Peace Cooperation Bill” in 1990. There were three different stances debated at the parliament; first, the UN Peace keeping operations

¹⁴ Auer, *op. cit.* pp 82.

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*





with non-military functions were permissible without the revision of the article nine; second, together with constitutional revision of the article nine, Japan's participation in UN PKO with both non-military and military functions should be possible: and third, the Japan's Self Defense Forces can participate as a UN forces without changing the Constitution.

Finally the UN Peace Cooperation Bill was passed by the Diet on June the 19th 1992, which, almost as the first group of thought, permits SDF troops to participate in UN peace keeping operations, but not peace-enforcing operations (no involvement in armed conflicts is permissible)¹⁶.

In addition, the International Emergency Rescue Force Law of 1992 also permits the SDF troops to be dispatched overseas for natural disaster emergencies.

4

POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE – THE POSSIBLE REVISION OF CONSTITUTION

Since the result of the election held in September 2005, which was unexpectedly successful for the LDP (The Liberal Democratic Party), the fact that LDP gained over two third seats of the House of Representatives together with coalition party, the "Komei", is theoretically possible to claim the revision of the constitution. That is why the revisionists within LDP have been revitalized to express their intentions on the revision of constitution more loudly.

Soon after the election, then, prime minister, Koizumi replied cautiously to be reluctant to the question of possible revision on the constitution¹⁷.

However, his successor Shinzo Abe who has, then, taken the president of LDP and soon after that elected by the Diet as prime minister in the fall of 2006, is more actively expressing views on the revision of the constitution. The revisionists today have focused on the article nine issue, instead of the symbol status of Emperor, which had once treated as a prime issue.

It is indeed a trend that not only the conservative political groups but also the several public opinion polls which were conducted in 2005–2006

¹⁶ Teruji Suzuki, *op. cit.* p. 21.

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*





by popular medias had indicated to support the trends by saying to be better taken some concrete measures to re-thinking of the article nine of the constitution. However, it does not yet support the revisionist approach by the 50% to 50% on the issue. Therefore, it may be understood that the people have been long frustrated by the dual structure or discrepancy between interpretation and political realities that the article nine and, the related operations of SDF. To analyze the more precisely the opinion polls on the constitutional issue, it may be induced a hypothesis that the people who replied to the polls are inclined to answer the question by asking for a rational solution, which is not necessarily revision but some sort of re-thinking on the article nine of the constitution adequately responding to international realities and domestic political implication.

There is no formal parliamentary commission established for the revision issues of the constitution. What the Abe Cabinet had been successful then, was to change the name of "the Agency of Self Defense Forces", which was disgraceful for some of the professional defense forces professionals, for "Ministry of Self Defense Forces".

It is obvious that the revisionists have focused on the question, to what extent, the existing SDF could be involved in military operations oversea, in particular in a case of international conflicts under the constitutional limitation relating to the ideals of pacifism. The Komei, coalition partner of the ruling party, has not yet declared stance on the problem. Some of the members are in principles pacifists and reluctant to revise the article nine of the constitution.

However, LDP headed by Abe had failed to maintain the previous seats at the upper house (the House of Councillors = Upper House) election, which was the first election under the leadership of Abe, held on July, 2007¹⁸.

As a result only the 37 (LDP) seats were reelected against the 60 (Democratic Party – DP) in the contested seats (121). Among the 106 of LDP seats at the upper house before the election the 63 seats were contested and the only 37 seats were succeeded to be reelected. Then, the upper house will be dominated by the oppositions, mainly, members of the DP=Democratic Party (total 109 seats), the Communist Party (7 seats), the Social-Democratic Party (5 seats) and the others (15 seats). It is, according to the reliable comments of political circles, an astonishing result which may cause resignation of the party leader, Abe. While prime minister Abe

¹⁸ "Asahi Shinbun", July 30 and 31, 2007.





expressed his fault for it, he refused to accept possible resignation soon after the election, and even stressed to improve the reconstruction of party strategy, the internal party pressure had finally made him to resign the post on September, 2007¹⁹.

He could not cope with the criticism against him. Practically since his resignation in both party leader and prime minister the elections have to be proceeded in LDP internal election first, as the party presidential election and then, parliamentary election. His successor Yasuo Fukuda was elected as a leader of the LDP after the political expose for the internal party members on 23rd of September, 2007. According to the constitutional rules of parliamentary cabinet system Hukuda as a candidate of the leading political party was elected as prime minister by the parliament, the house of representatives, first of all, where LDP maintains majority seats. There are same reasons why the ex-prime minister Abe had resigned the post. One of the reasons was that his deep disappointment on fate of the bill which is proposing for further tight joint operation of SDF with US Forces, particularly in the Gulf War and Afghanistan (on satellite intelligent activities and oil supplies), which he had agreed with President Bush at his first visit to the USA in spring 2007²⁰.

In principle the proposed bill was based and extended on the previous law on special overseas military operation for anti-terrorism, which had terminated in 2007. Except Abe's LDP, the Democratic Party (DP) and the other parties are all reluctant to strengthen this kind of overseas operation of SDF and critical about the new bill proposed by Abe cabinet because of the possible interference of the constitutional rules. The newly elected as prime minister, Hukuda was representing the friction of groups of LDP, which were in principle pacifists and critical on the Abe policy for the strengthening overseas military operation of SDF.

However, Hukuda was a short lived prime minister and resigned in 2008 after one year in administration. It was said that his compromising approach in order to get supports for the bill of the Extension Oversea Cooperation of SDF, which will be followed by the previous law of the same purpose. Both the critical groups within the party (the right) and the oppositions of the other parties (the left) were critical and reluctant to agree with him at the pre-negotiation process.

¹⁹ "Asahi Shinbun", Sept. 19, 2007.

²⁰ Harukata Takenaka, *The Upper House Election Paradox*, "Chuo Koron", May 2007, p. 122–132.





COOPERATION WITH NATO AS A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

With the end of Cold War in Asia debates on security issues are broadly developed by various groups of people in Japan. Despite reflectively the different stances demonstrated by the parliamentary debates, there are some administrative steps developed based on the previous laws through "flexible interpretations on the constitution".

Several important cases on international cooperation were reported.

On March 7, 2007 the representatives of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and new Ministry of Defense jointly held high-level talks in Tokyo with officials from NATO. Then, it was agreed that Japan would implement grass-roots human security grant aid on the order of two billion yen over the next few years in such areas as primary education and medical care and hygiene, cooperation with the joint military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams that NATO is deploying in Afghanistan.

The target projects are to be selected by the Japanese government on the basis of consultation with civilian representatives of NATO. This was a new development in Japan-NATO cooperation. Until 2007 Japan has cooperated with individual member countries of NATO (mainly with the United States) in Indian Ocean and Iraq, but this is the first time for Japan to enter into a cooperative arrangement directly with NATO itself.

The expansive attitude of NATO toward the outside has already expressed previously (Sofia, 2006). The ministers of foreign affairs of NATO called for a global military partnership extending to such neutral countries as Finland, Sweden and countries of the "Western" camp in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. In response for it the Japanese side, both Foreign Minister Aso (present Prime Minister since 2008) and then, Prime Minister Abe visited separately NATO in Brussels in 2007 for the first time and both delivered speeches at the head quarter of NATO, explaining that while adhering to the principles of the Constitution, Japanese will no longer shay away from carrying out oversea activities involving the Self Defense Forces. Prime Minister Abe (despite soon after that, he resigned in 2007) stated further that "my country is ready to meet the world's rising expectations for our enhanced role in the international community". It was welcomed





by the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who said that he was highly encouraged by the prime minister's speech to cooperation with the humanitarian activities of NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan²¹.

It is true that during the post Cold War period Japan has dispatched on the missions various locations on the basis of laws under the constitutional frame work like PKO Cooperation Law (June, 1992) or Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law (Oct., 2001), but Japan's SDF is obliged to avoid involving in activities in "a combat zone". However, under the cooperation projects of the Japan-NATO means a little different from the previous arrangement in terms at the constitutional interpretation even if it was adhering to the principles of the Constitution²².

Following the cooperation agreement with NATO, Japan and Australia agreed a cooperation on security, which was a result of the governmental meeting held in Tokyo on December, 2008²³. Both countries are the outsiders of NATO, but cooperative with NATO. While Austrian military is composed of about 51,000 soldiers in total, and is much smaller than Japan's SDF (according to the data of 2007, the divisions comprised around 250,000 military staff), the government is cooperative in responding to international expectations by sending nearly 3,800 soldier's abroad like Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, it is said that Japan has to learn these precedences in the case of Australia

The difference between the security environment in East Asia and that of the North Atlantic, but there has definitely been a shift in global thinking about security. In formalistic point of view, NATO was funded for the purpose of security for the Western Alliance in Europe against the Eastern Bloc headed by the Soviet Union, who had the Warsaw Pact Alliance²⁴, but at the present, although the principle that the members are requested to take action in response to an attack on another member is preserved, the purposes is focused on peace-keeping operations and conflicts prevention activities and it is becoming more of a collective security organization aimed at crisis management

²¹ Ibidem.

²² H. Abe, M. Shindo, S. Kawato, *The Government and Politics of Japan*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1990, p. 101.

²³ Hirota Watanabe, op. cit, p. 160-167; "Yomiuri Shinbun", Dec. 19, 2008.

²⁴ Bronisław Geremek, *Rosja i Niemcy już nam nie grożą*, Rzeczpospolita, 12 marca 2004; Janusz Stefanowicz (red.), *Polska-NATO, 1990-1997*, Warszawa 1997.





6

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY DOCTRINE AS AN ALTERNATIVE

During the Cold War security and defense policies of Japan were formulated by the recommendations largely depended on the US strategic policy in Asia. It is indeed symbolic to see that formation of SDF has been developed under the influences of US Occupation policies. However, the international environments has dramatically been changed. The Cold War in Asia is almost over, and with the end of Cold War a new security and defense system based on a new strategic thinking is asked to be built in Japan and Asia. There were several important moments to make the public awaken on them. It is indeed for the second time since the 1960s to re-consider national security and defense issue seriously. In the 1960s at the time of Japan–US Security Treaty amended the nation-wide people were involved in the debates by actively taking part in the demonstrations protesting against the ratification of the treaty, mainly due to the fear or doubt of whether such a close alliance with US made Japan more dangerously involved in the Cold War or not?

Although the treaty was ratified, then, people are used to consider seriously the question because the constitutional pacifism had been widely prevailed in those years. It was often called as "ANPPO SEDAI" – the generation who had involved in the incident at the time, had survived also from the War, and therefore, they wished keenly to preserve peace as the persistent pacifists. Taking such a social background into consideration there should be some reasons why there are not only the opposition parties but also some members of the conservative LDP have not yet been decisive on the security stance, as it was symbolic to see the cases of the successive short lived fates of prime ministers like Abe and Fukuda in recent years²⁵.

It is generally accepted that as far as the security issue no zero-some options could be adequate in Japan.

Most of the international law students have recognized that sovereign state in terms of international law, has a right of self defense as it was coincidentally stated by General MacArthur at the time of establishing the special divisions of police forces in 1950 (it later became SDF in 1954), but it could not be justified to say further that for the purpose of self defense state

²⁵ Nonaka Naoto, *What's Gone Wrong with the Abe Administration?*, "Ronza", June 2007, p. 92–99.





is fully entitled to build capability of self defense forces which is purely domestic matters, decided by the constitutional order. So, it is quite reasonable to see many of those people who supported the idea have regarded SDF as unconstitutional from the beginning of its formation. For instance, the leading opposition party, the Socialist Party (SP) which had played an important role in the 1960s, has not recognized all the military capabilities shaped by SDF.

Despite those differences of public opinions the government is in progress to build SDF stronger in responding to international expectations in particular US government, which has demanded same concrete contributions toward building peace and stable international environments. However, more precisely to observe the decision making process of the Japanese government it was also characteristic to see the balance of public opinions taken into account. Besides, it may be some influences of the international pressure since 1967.

The US government has changed attitude on international security in taking coming the Post Vietnam War into consideration. Newly elected president, Nixon declared in 1967 a new policy on international security by stating that principles of crisis solution in the given country has first to be responsible to solve it by herself, then, treated by the area, and the US involvement in the issue to be limited as the second as the third option²⁶.

In addition, with the, growth and the strong economic power of Japan trade conflicts, particularly on trade surplus, between Japan and US had often been reported and, further, the unsatisfied US public opinion symbolized by so called, "free rider" propaganda, which said that Japan gained economically, but did not contribute nothing on international security, became a serious problem²⁷.

The experts who are critical of the militarism by strengthening military capabilities through SDF, had formulated an idea that national security under the constitutional order (even within the framework the flexible interpretation allowed) should be considered not only in military terms, but also more broadly by including oversea economic assistance and various intellectual cooperation, which later were elaborated as a term of "comprehensive national security doctrine" = CNSD²⁸.

²⁶ President Richard Nixon's statement in Gum on July 25, 1968.

²⁷ Shinkichi Eto, Yoshinohu Yamamoto, *Sogo Anppo to Mirai no senntaku* (Comprehensive Security and Future Choice), Tokyo, 1991, p. 300.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 557.





The idea was first proposed by then, prime minister Ohira in 1979, who was conscious of the limit of development of military capabilities because of the constitutional principles. This seemed at the beginning a merely policy expression, but it became influential on decision making process of the government. According to the doctrine, the political and social stability and economic growth model of Japan and its neighbors as components of Japan's own national security and as a result Japan's economic growth policy is justified and its aid to the countries of South East Asia and China are contributions to the security of itself and of the region as a whole. Although there are some criticism on the comprehensive doctrine that it is merely Japanese rationalization for single minded economic diplomacy and avoidance of rearmament²⁹, this broad and not exclusive military definition of national security seems realistically evaluated, in particular in the post-Cold War era, when military power promises to be a less valuable tool in international affairs than it was before³⁰.

It took some time to elaborate a written document. "The General Principles on the Oversea Development Assistance" drafted based on some practices was declared on, June, 1992. According to the principles, the assistance should be humanitarian, mutual interdependence taken into account, developmental but environmental protection orientated, non-military in character and promoting democratization in the given country (on June 30, 1992)³¹.

After the War Japan's expenditure for foreign assistance or cooperation related with the peace treaties was first implemented as a part of war reparation, but since the 1980s it became more policy or strategy orientated. Then, since the 1990s it has become more policy oriented due to the projects based on the general principles of comprehensive security doctrine of 1992 (see above).

In the case of China, for example, which had been the biggest assistance receiving country from Japan during the 1990s and 2000s. Since the concluding of the friendship treaty on August 1978 the economic cooperation projects with China have been promoted based on the treaty and since 1996 the amount of it has been escalated four times more than the first year of the 1980's, which has reached about annually 2,000 billion yen (20 billion

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Shiraishi Takeshi, *Crafting Japan's Asia Policy in a Multicolor World*, "Ushio", June 2008, p. 58–65.

³¹ H. Abe, M. Shindo, S. Kawato, *The Government and Politics of Japan*, Tokyo, 1990, p. 101.





in UB dollar's) since 1997 (1997 = 2201 billion Yen, 1998 = 2240 billion Yen, 1999 = 2058 billion yen, 2000 = 2273 billion yen)³².

However, China had once involved unnecessarily in military action – nuclear bomb test, which the Japanese government understood unfavorable for the conditionality for the comprehensive security doctrine, and then, the implementation was suspended and the amount of the assistance reduced in 1995. During 2004–2005 there were also critical views on military building in China expressed by the Japanese officials, then, the amount of it was reduced as a result of the re-negotiation on projects taking account the comments.

Thus, Japan's total amount of the oversea economic assistance disbursement has quickly developed and reached a level of the 6,726 million (US dollars), for a single year in 2002, which as far as the amount is concerned, made Japan one of the leading donor countries, second to US.

According to the reports in 2002; the amount is allocated in following: China = 829, Indonesia = 538, India = 494, Vietnam = 375, Philippines = 318, Pakistan = 301, Thailand = 222, Bangladesh = 123, Peru = 120, Tanzania = 58 (all in million US dollars)³³.

In addition, Japan had jointly with USA, EU and Saudi Arabia organized in Tokyo (Jan., 2002) an international conference on assistance for reconstruction of Afghanistan with the participation of the over 61 states. The conference had succeeded to declare joint assistance programs of total amount of the 15 billion US dollars. In particular Japan alone declared to grant total amount of 5 billion dollars for building of infrastructure and civil stabilization programs for 2002–2004.

³² Japan 2005, Keizai Koho Center, Tokyo, 2005.

³³ Ibid.:

	Army	Navy	Air Forces	Expenditures (US Million Dollars)
US	485,5	400,0	367,6	436,521
Russia	321,0	155,0	184,0	–
China	1700,0	250,0	400,0	–
Germany	191,4	25,7	67,5	25,825
UK	116,7	42,4	53,6	47,696
France	137,0	44,3	64,0	36,123
Japan	148,2	44,4	45,6	36,665





Thus, the economic assistance programs implemented as a part of comprehensive security policy, have been well known as a major components of the Japanese security policies. It is, however, not simple to understand the background of national security policy in Japan as a whole, because the doctrine is based on an unique concept of security which has included meanings not only in terms of conventional security through military capabilities, but also understanding of the other components like economic assistance, its international repercussions and so on.

Under Japan's specific conditions of the constitutional limit on strengthening military capabilities it is indeed innovative approach to a security policy. Naturally it takes times to be recognized internationally that the comprehensive security doctrine is a characteristics of Japan's peace preserving policies. It is formulated and implemented broadly in everyday practices as a part of Japanese diplomacy.

At the same time with some constitutional debates, it is also important to see the fact that a fairly big SDF has been already built with legal arrangements, even ready to cooperate with UN overseas operations³⁴.

From the conventional view point, Japan was at the beginning legally naked with no defense facilities after the war, but gradually her defense capabilities has been built by multiple ways.

Naturally international strategic point view Japan not as the Swiss type of neutral country, has been protected by the Japan-US Security Alliance since her conclusion of peace treaty in 1951, although depending on the US policy and her financed situation the government of Japan has financed almost 40% of the cost of the US Forces stationed in Japan (so called "Omoiyari" voluntary financial contribution, annually over 4,000 billion Yen).

From comprehensive aspects Japan's defense and security system is formulated by three pillars mutually functioning with the other elements of her international relations, which are just mentioned above, the first, SDF within the framework of the constitutional limits, the second, the military collaboration between Japan and USA based on the Japan-US Security Treaty³⁵ and the third, various, international assistance and cooperation based on the Comprehensive National Security Doctrine.

³⁴ Hisashi Owada, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security – The Current Debate in the Light of Reform Proposals*, "The Japanese Annual of International Law", no. 48, 2005, p. 1.

³⁵ US Forces Personnel Strength in Japan: Army = 1,670, Navy = 6,380, Marine Corp. = 15,850, Air Force = 13,090. The total number of 36,960 personnel, most of them are stationing at bases in Okinawa (located southern part of Japan near to Formosa).

