@article {5917,
	title = {The Dualism of Prudence },
	journal = {Prakseologia},
	volume = {2019},
	year = {2019},
	abstract = {Contrary to the rather commonly held opinion that the understanding of prudence (as a certain virtue) has not changed essentially since the ancient times, it is argued in the paper that there are two not only distinct but also incompatible concepts of prudence: the modern {\textendash} amoral or nonmoral, and the classical (Aristotelian-Th omist) {\textendash} strictly moral. Th e claim that these concepts are distinct and incompatible implies that {\textquoteleft}modern prudence{\textquoteright} is not part of {\textquoteleft}classical prudence{\textquoteright} but is essentially diff erent from it: one cannot be prudent in both senses (for instance, part of modern prudence is continence/self-control, whereas classical prudence excludes continence/self-control). Apart from the comparison of both concepts of prudence, the paper also provides an analysis of their relations with the so-called {\textquoteleft}prudential values{\textquoteright} as well as of the causes of the evolution (or rather: revolution) in the understanding of prudence which took place in modern philosophy; It is also argued that within ethics which assumes the classical understanding of prudence there is no place for what Sidgwick called the {\textquoteleft}dualism of practical reason{\textquoteright}.},
	issn = {0079-4872},
	doi = {10.7206/prak.0079-4872_2015_160_28}
}
