@article {6171,
	title = {Some remarks on the Google ECJ ruling (C-131/12)},
	journal = {Krytyka Prawa. Niezale{\.z}ne studia nad prawem},
	volume = {6},
	year = {2014},
	month = {3/2014},
	pages = {115{\textendash}125},
	abstract = {A large number of opinions have been expressed about the decision C-131/12. Initially, Google{\textquoteright}s defeat has been widely welcomed as the giant had suffered a bitter defeat. After a first joy about the containment of Google{\textquoteright}s arrogance it became clear that the excessive claim for right to be forgotten will dry out our sources of information. Can privacy be seen as a fear for diversity of opinion? It may be due to the tension between data and reputation protection on the one hand and the possibility to protect against lies and fraud on the other hand. It is not just Google{\textquoteright}s freedom of expression, which is in the centre of our interests. We want to find informations and Google is helping us in this regard. Forcing Google to suppress the information flow can not hinder Google to earn money. If we go through the opinion of the Advocate General and compare it with the reasoning of
the ECJ, then we come to the conclusion, that the ECJ had to decide in this a way on the grounds of the current legal status. The ECJ was standing with the back to the wall, because it has to apply the current law and this left no option open. Thus, the ECJ could not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. In the following I will shortly summarize the Spanish Data Protection Authority (SDPA) decision, before moving to the Advocate General opinion and the judgment of the ECJ and finally provide an outlook on possible
future development in this regard. },
	issn = {2080-1084},
	doi = {10.7206/kp.2080-1084.42}
}
