@article {6687,
	title = {Integralno{\'s}{\'c} s{\k e}dziego w orzekaniu i zachowaniu},
	journal = {Krytyka Prawa. Niezale{\.z}ne Studia nad Prawem},
	volume = {13},
	year = {2021},
	month = {10/2021},
	pages = {64-80},
	abstract = {The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge{\textquoteright}s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin{\textquoteright}s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge{\textquoteright}s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge{\textquoteright}s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.
},
	issn = {2080-1084},
	doi = {10.7206/kp.2080-1084.472}
}
