

# Re-Enfranchising the World: What is the Price of Peace and Security?

by Christopher A. Furlow

Department of Anthropology, University of Florida, USA

## ABSTRACT

This article engages in the analysis of the 9/11 Commission Report. In the wake of the attacks, the government of the USA examined and adjusted its defense strategies and foreign policies. Less time has been spent reflecting on the root causes of terrorism and how and why the United States came to be hated by some individuals and groups so much that they would kill thousands of innocent people and what alternatives to the Bush administration's policies exist such that the United States (and other economically-developed states) can do to overcome this danger.

*"Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States."* Opening of The 9/11 Commission Report[1]

With this statement, the 9/11 Commission begins its final report on the "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001"[2]. The sheer magnitude and audacity of the attacks on major icons of American economic and military strength that killed 2,752 people shocked both the citizens of the United States and people around the world.

In the wake of these attacks, the government of the United States is examining and adjusting its defense strategies and foreign policy. Its response in this post-9/11 world has been the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security and a more proactive and determined approach to military engagement with terrorist organizations and foreign states believed to be supporting or harboring these organizations. In essence, the Bush administration's response to 9/11 has been power politics (which relies on threats, economic embargoes, and military intervention) to impose its agenda on the world and the

American people. Less time has been spent reflecting on (1) the root causes of terrorism and how and why the United States came to be hated by some individuals and groups so much that they would kill thousands of innocent people and (2) what alternatives to the Bush administration's policies exist such that the United States (and other economically-developed states) can develop and implement new, alternative foreign policy regimes that look for peaceful means that enhance global security and reduce anti-American and anti-Western sentiment.

President Bush said he was shocked and confused to learn that there is a high level of anti-American feeling and anger at the United States around the world. I was surprised that President Bush was so surprised[3].

The question I start from is not why did 9/11 happen but why had it not happened sooner. The United States has been the target of numerous terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda in the decade leading up to 9/11 including coordinated attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, an attack on the Khobar Towers, an attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the waters of Ye-

men, and, perhaps most significantly, the 1993 attempt to blow-up the World Trade Center. Usama Bin Laden has repeatedly published fatwas and given public interviews calling on Muslims to attack the United States[4]. In addition to Islamist terrorist attacks on the U.S., there have also been several domestic acts of terrorism. The most significant were the truck bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the anthrax attacks that remain unsolved, the Unabomber, the Olympic bombing, the D.C. snipers, and a number of attacks on abortion clinics[5].

The Bush and Clinton administrations and the media have failed to link the underlying causes of Islamist and American domestic terrorism. The Islamists are represented as at war with the U.S., with the civilized world, or with freedom - an apocalyptic vision - and the product of "eccentric and violent ideas sprouting in the fertile ground of political and social turmoil" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; The White House, 2003). Domestic, American terrorists, on the other hand, are represented as psychologically disturbed individuals or small groups. According to the U.S. government and the media, the only feature common to both Islamist and domestic terrorists seems to be irrationality and mental illness. It seems incomprehensible to the U.S. government and media that these otherwise disparate groups and individuals are all using violence to protest the effects of globalization and American policy on their lives and societies[6].

The U.S. government and media have misdiagnosed the underlying causes of 9/11. The processes of economic globalization are transforming society and the state. I will examine how these transformations are fomenting opposition including violent anti-American opposition and the underlying crisis that confronts the U.S. as it struggles to maintain global dominance. It is my contention that terrorism is a symptom of structural problems inherent to the globalization of capitalism. By failing to recognize the root causes and address them, the United States (and other economically-de-

veloped states), undermine global peace and security. After diagnosing the causes of terrorism and the Bush administration's response, I propose an alternative project of re-enfranchising the world in order to move toward a more peaceful, democratic, and just world[7].

### **DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, THE COLD WAR, AND VIOLENCE**

The United States is the main proponent and economic beneficiary of globalization[8]. Some characterize globalization as the Americanization or westernization of the world, others caricature it as McDonaldization (Ritzer, 2000); however, most analysts agree it has to do with the spread of capitalism and mass communication around the world. What people mean by this is, at one level anyway, that you can travel the world and experience many of the same hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues, and transport used in the U.S.

Beyond anecdotes about the things people experience directly, are the structural inequalities in the global economic system. These inequalities encourage (some would say force) most people in less-developed countries to ransom their labor and natural resources to service huge national debt incurred in the process of opening their countries to foreign capital and corporations (e.g. European, Japanese, and U.S.) that care more about profit than local social and economic development (Stiglitz, 2003)[9].

Economic globalization did not happen overnight. WWII left the economies of most of Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan in shambles. The United States, in contrast, emerged with the strongest economy in the world, accounting for nearly half the combined gross world product in 1947, due both to the decline of its former economic competitors and the fact that the vast majority of military combat took place (and therefore had the most damaging impact) outside American territory during both WWI and WWII (White, 1998). The decentralization of capital away from Europe

to the United States between WWI and WWII marked the end of the British Empire (and other colonial-based European Empires) and signaled the rise of the American Empire.

Capitalism, particularly in its monopolistic and oligopolistic guises that predominate today, suffers from a recurring crisis of over accumulation that must be remedied via the decentralization of capital[10]. Following WWII, the U.S. faced just such a crisis and responded by reinvigorating the economies of Western Europe and Japan via massive capital investments. Similarly, the 1970s oil crisis punctuated another crisis of over accumulation and was remedied by a transition to finance capitalism and the rise of neo-liberalism that enabled capital to move more freely across state borders (Harvey, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003). The transition to finance capitalism and the rise of neo-liberalism has created the structural configurations that currently undermine global peace and security.

Neo-liberalism, as an ideology, views the decline of state regulation of trade and finance as central to the promotion of economic growth and development. Neo-liberal ideology fueled American capitalist imperialism[11] and resulted in a tacit agreement between the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury to promote neo-liberal policies around the globe and specifically as conditions attached to loans, which came to be known as the Washington consensus. The results of these policies include the decline of state control over national economies, the subordination of domestic economic policies to the logic of global capitalism, and the decentralization of capital. In other words, globalization (Stiglitz, 2003; Harvey, 2003).

The triumph of neo-liberalism temporarily relieved the pressure from capitalism's recurring crisis of over accumulation. The deregulation of the flow of capital enabled the decentralization of capital from the U.S., Europe, and Japan to East and Southeast Asia, Mexico, Brazil, and India. China, in particular, has been the greatest beneficiary as capitalists look for new places to maximize return on

investment.

Ironically, however, the triumph of neo-liberalism continues to undermine the political power of the U.S. and greatly increases the rate at which over accumulation can arise anew. Economic competition and the price mechanism drive the market economy toward ever higher levels of productive efficiency, economic growth, and the integration of national markets. In time, the market produces profound shifts in the location of economic activities and affects the international redistribution of economic and industrial power. The unleashing of market forces transforms the political framework itself, undermines the hegemonic power, and creates a new political environment to which the world must eventually adjust. With the inevitable shift in the international distribution of economics and military power from the core to rising nations in the periphery and elsewhere, the capacity of the hegemon to maintain the system decreases. Capitalism and the market system thus tend to destroy the political foundations on which they must ultimately rest. (Gilpin, 1987)

The decline in U.S. economic power is visible in several areas. The U.S. share of the gross world product has declined from near 50 percent following WWII to 20 percent or less in the 1990s. The U.S. went from the greatest creditor state in 1980 to the greatest debtor state in 1990 and remains so today (White, 1998). These statistics do not bode well for the future economic strength of the U.S. In order for the U.S. to maintain its empire, the U.S. must balance the ever present need to expand its economy and power against the dangers of imperial overstretch. Capital accumulation requires the simultaneous accumulation of power (Arendt, 1968). At the same time, there is a danger of attempting to expand power beyond a state's capacity to support its global commitments (Kennedy, 1987; Kennedy, 1992; Arrighi, 1994). If Kennedy (1992) is correct, the U.S. is at the verge of imperial overstretch.

Economic globalization has resulted in significant transformations of society. Most

relevant here are transformations that result in the increase of conditions that promote social and political conflict. Friedman (2003) argues that globalization results in the fragmentation of society both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, a new cosmopolitan class has emerged consisting of economic and political elites whose prosperity is tied to the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism rather than the expansion or success of a specific state. In contrast to this relatively small group of cosmopolitan elites, there is a rapidly growing underclass due to the increasing disparity between the haves and the have-nots sparked by the decline in the economic self-regulatory powers of states. This disconnect between the interests of social classes helps explain the rise of the various anti-globalization social movements, civil wars, terrorism, and anti-Americanism despite a general trend toward economic expansion[12].

The decline of the state, the rise of a cosmopolitan class, and the increase in social stratification also creates tensions horizontally between groups within nationally-grounded underclasses. The rise of identity-based groups within states, whether they are based on religion, ethnicity, gender, or race, at one time thought to contradict the homogenizing aspects of globalization must now be viewed as an outcome of globalization. Specifically, as state hegemony declines, the ability of the state to create citizen-based identities declines (Friedman, 2003).

Friedman's (2003) notion of a vanishing future is particularly critical here. The need for a future, for a future orientation, for progress underlies the modernist project[13]. For those located in war zones where violence is an everyday part of life, the future is obliterated (Nordstrom, 2004). Even here though, in places like Angola, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Bosnia, Columbia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where violence is at its most oppressive, there are cosmopolitans making their fortunes through a variety of activities on the borders of the "il/legal" and "il/licit" as Nordstrom so aptly describes things. Places where guns are run side by side with humanitarian aid, where

diamonds and drugs travel out by night on the same planes and trucks that deliver food and water by day, and where warfare itself is often fought by capitalist mercenaries like South African based Executive Outcomes (Nordstrom, 2004). The future is thus being simultaneously made for a few and obliterated for most.

The future is not just in doubt for the marginal underclass. Following the supposed end of the cold war, the U.S. military-industrial complex needed a new mission to justify its own existence. Arguably, it found one in Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" hypothesis (Huntington, 1993). According to Huntington, the next phase of global conflict would be between entire civilizations. Although Huntington named several contending civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African), American foreign policy experts focused primarily on Islamic civilization[14].

Huntington's hypothesis fed into pre-conceived fears of Islam; fear that grew in response to the OPEC oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the attack on American Marines in Beirut, and the Palestinian uprisings. These heightened pragmatic concerns arising from U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

If Americans began to fear Islam, many Muslims seized on Huntington's hypothesis as confirmation of their worst fears that the U.S. and the West planned to conquer Islamic civilization. Radical Muslims, in turn, viewed this as confirmation that they were indeed a threat to the West and could challenge western predominance. This aided and abetted the ideological motivation of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda that added the U.S. to their list of enemies of Islam[15].

Islamist extremism has risen in the context of the transition from European colonialism to economic globalization. Most of the Muslim world only gained independence in the two decades following WWII. During the colonial period, most of the Muslim world's economy was

dedicated to enriching European empires and the center-periphery relations continued following independence though the center power often shifted from a Western European state to either the U.S. or Soviet Union. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union forged alliances around the world and tried to subvert each other's attempts to gain influence. Both countries and their allies overthrew unfriendly governments and armed the world to levels never before seen in order to dominate the world politically, economically, and militarily.

The common belief is that the cold war ended circa 1989[16]. However, in a sense, the world continues to fight the cold war. The U.S. and the Soviets are reaping what they have sown - large arms inventories around the world, increasingly lax controls on U.S. sales of arms and dual use items, development policies that create dependency and resentment abroad, and guerilla fighters trained, equipped, and then abandoned by the U.S. and Soviets - in other words, arms proliferation and those willing and able to use them.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has had many consequences. One consequence is that the U.S. is the only remaining superpower. Following from this, less of the world is dependent directly upon U.S. military strength for its protection and sovereignty. Thus, much more of the world is willing to express anti-American views as the U.S. attempts to expand its military, political-economic, and socio-cultural dominance. There is a love-hate relationship with the United States. Much of the world loves and desires American material culture (TVs, cell phones, and computers) and standard of living (Joseph, 1959). However, much of the world also hates American military hegemony[17], the globalization of capitalism (Stiglitz, 2003; International Forum on Globalization, 2002), unconstrained American popular culture and media (Tomlinson, 1991, 1999), and American foreign policy (Bennis, 2003; Vidal, 2002; Chomsky, 2003).

American foreign policy is a significant cause of anti-Americanism, for it is through its

foreign policy that the U.S. functionally deploys its mutually reinforcing military, political-economic, and socio-cultural domination around the world and particularly in the Muslim world. American policy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iraq War and the policies of sanctions and bombings that preceded it, American support for widely disliked and oppressive but pro-American regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, and the existence of large American military bases throughout the Persian Gulf region all promote anti-Americanism in the Muslim world[18].

However, it is important to remember that terrorism did not begin or end on 9/11. Nor is it limited to Islamist extremists. Terrorism is a tactic used by many groups including anarchists in the early twentieth century, the IRA and Unionist militias in Ireland, Basque separatists in Spain, and secular nationalist Palestinians as well as by Islamist extremists like al-Qaeda to name but a few[19]

In the U.S., the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is another example of terrorism. Timothy McVeigh, a veteran of the Persian Gulf War working alone or with a small group, killed 183 people as a protest against and revenge for the U.S. government's invasion of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco two years earlier that killed more than eighty people including twenty-seven children. While the mainstream media presented McVeigh as the archetypal irrational, psychologically disturbed individual, the court-appointed psychologist who examined his fitness for trial viewed McVeigh merely as "over sensitive, to the point of being a little paranoid, about the actions of the government" and who wanted "revenge because of the Waco assault, but [McVeigh] also wanted to make a political statement about the role of the federal government and protest the use of force against the citizens" (Vidal, 2002).

The views of McVeigh must also be framed in the context of economic globalization. In the U.S., government opposition grew in the wake of economic decline in rural areas,

e.g. the disappearance of family-owned farms following the growth and consolidation of corporate agri-business and the boarding-up of small town main streets with the growth of giant corporate retailers like Wal-Mart. The Americans most affected by this economic transformation have increasingly joined identity-based groups, be they religious (“mainstream” or “cultist” like the Branch Davidians) or in growing frequency anti-government, anti-globalization, and occasionally militant organizations.

McVeigh saw himself as a counter-insurgent against what he viewed as the unconstitutional infringement of citizens’ rights by the U.S. government. McVeigh is not alone in these beliefs. For example, nearly one thousand different “Patriot” militias exist in the U.S. that hold similar beliefs to McVeigh as do many libertarians, members of the Christian right, and Republican politicians like former U.S. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich[20].

In summary, the legacy of economic globalization and the cold war is global violence. Dozens and dozens of exploited and abandoned states, vertical and horizontal fragmentation of society, unfettered arms proliferation, and high levels of anti-American and anti-Western sentiment regularly explode into violent confrontations. We have “freedom fighters” turned “terrorists” in Afghanistan. We have nuclear weapons and ICBMs in North Korea. We have the meltdown of the former Yugoslavia abandoned but left well armed after the Soviet demise. We have the Israeli-Palestinian crisis still unresolved following years of influence pedaling in the Middle East. And of course there is Iraq - armed by everyone, and now occupied by the U.S.

## THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE

The Bush administration views 9/11 not as a symptom of structural problems inherent to the globalization of capitalism and American foreign policy during and after the cold war, but as the first major battle in a Global War on Terror (GWOT). The operational goal of this war

is to degrade terrorist organizations such that the war against terrorism returns to the criminal domain (The White House, 2003)[21].

The significance of the GWOT is that it marks a transition from neo-liberalism to neo-conservatism that began with the Bush administration. According to Harvey (2003), the transition to neo-conservatism entails a movement towards the logic of territory rather than the logic of capital, domination/coercion, accumulation by dispossession, and the risky strategy of global domination via control of oil. The shift is often referred to as a strategy of unilateralism in the media and political debates. Hardt and Negri (2004) prefer the term “exceptionalism”[22]. For example, the U.S. government argues that the U.S. is exceptional because it is both the only remaining superpower and more virtuous than other states. Thus, the U.S. maintains it need not be constrained by international law. Arguing along these lines, Condoleeza Rice, who later became the National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State under President Bush, noted that “America’s military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability” (Rice, 2000). Exemplifying American exceptionalism, the U.S. has not been a party to major international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court. The U.S. has also worked to weaken or undermine other international efforts and treaties, particularly in relation to arms control. For example, in addition to withdrawing from the ABM Treaty with Russia, the U.S. has stalled negotiations on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Protocol and undermined the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons that would have prohibited the provision of weapons to non-state actors.

The Bush administration contends there is no alternative. However, many alternatives exist[23]. One alternative deserves particular mention because it is one that is latent in the Bush administration’s own policy statement. On September 17, 2002, the White House released a document titled *The National Security*

*Strategy of the United States of America.* The aim of this policy is “to help make the world not just safer but better.” The goals of the plan are “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” The means to these ends can be summarized roughly as: (1) champion human dignity, (2) strengthen alliances and cooperate with other states in order to defeat global terrorism and defuse regional conflicts, (3) expand economic growth, development, and democracy by expanding capitalism and building the infrastructure of democracy, and (4) transform national security institutions to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world, i.e., the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (The White House, 2002).

These goals, taken together, are generally commendable. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has failed to operationally deploy them in a constructive fashion. Instead of championing human dignity, the Bush administration has reduced civil liberties at home. Strengthening alliances and cooperating with other states has translated into U.S. unilateralism, contempt for international law, and the oft quoted threat that “you’re either with us or you’re with the terrorists” (Bennis, 2003; Bush, 2001). Expanding economic growth, development, and democracy is being accomplished through warfare, if at all. And the transforming of national security institutions has meant creating the new Department of Homeland Security and pre-emptive, or more accurately, preventive war (Kaysen, Steinbruner, & Malin, 2002).

As a result, much of the world (including many of the United States’ friends and allies) and many American citizens view the actions of the United States’ government and particularly of the Bush administration as self-righteous and hypocritical. According to this perspective, the U.S. government ignores world opinion while transforming the world into an American-owned subsidiary. The United States claims a moral high ground when the U.S. is really acting in its own selfish interests. Much of the world sees the U.S. as a bully that uses threats, embar-

goes, and military intervention whenever the U.S. wants to make greater profit or feel its way of life is infringed upon. This, they believe, is what happens whenever American oil supplies are threatened and when American corporations are tariffed heavily or are denied access to markets or critical raw materials.

## RE-ENFRANCHISING THE WORLD

*“Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists cost of millions.”* U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

*“The dominant trend in American foreign-policy thinking must be to transform power into consensus so that the international order is based on agreement rather than reluctant acquiescence.”* Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger[24].

Foreign policy must respond to the very causes of our current dilemmas. Economic globalization creates structural tensions vertically between a class of cosmopolitan elites and the rest of society and horizontally between identity-based groups organized along the lines of ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. that emerged with the decline of state power and their ability to forge citizen-based identities. The result of these structural tensions created via economic globalization is an increase in opposition groups, some peaceful, some violent, ranging from global organizations like The Nature Conservancy and al-Qaeda to local labor organizers and individuals like Timothy McVeigh. The common link is the fight against the impacts of economic globalization be they the loss of jobs, the rise of economic insecurity, or military intervention to protect access to vital resources like oil.

In addition, capitalism faces a crisis of over accumulation in the United States. To adjust, capital is rapidly being decentralized out

of the U.S. to a handful of emerging economies. In particular, China is reaping huge capital investments and appears prepared to overtake the U.S. economically over the next several decades.

Global peace and security depends upon transforming economic globalization in such a way that (1) mitigates the structural tensions inherent in the current configuration of globalization, (2) finds a solution to the crisis of capital over accumulation, and (3) does not result merely in the rise of another global hegemon[25].

## TWO PATHS TO HEGEMONY

There are two paths to hegemony: “domination” and “intellectual and moral leadership”. The path of domination usually leads to the rise of competitors while the path of intellectual and moral leadership usually enhances the power of the hegemon. The difference lies in the perception of states about the motivations of the hegemon. In the first instance, the hegemon trying to dominate its peers and impose its vision of the world on others is viewed as self-interested. In contrast, the hegemon that is an intellectual and moral leader is viewed as pursuing the general interest (Arrighi & Silver, 1999).

The U.S. is currently leading by domination. To succeed in the Global War on Terror, the United States must offer intellectual and moral leadership that pursues the general interest while solving its own problem of over accumulation. The logical next phase, in my opinion, is the re-enfranchisement of the nations cast adrift not the clash of civilizations latent in the Global War on Terror. The U.S. (and other economically developed countries) must re-enfranchise the rest of the world by investing capital in the global infrastructure. By investing capital in global infrastructure, the U.S. slows its hegemonic decline without gambling everything on the control of oil resources that even if successful has a limited time horizon. High-risk strategies tend to cost more and result in a greater likelihood of catastrophic wars. The

route of peaceful disarmament, democracy, and economic development around the world is the straightest path to peace and security. It is possible to reduce armed conflict, raise the quality of life for billions of people, and remedy much of the anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism around the globe through peaceful means. Plus, peaceful democratic reform, disarmament, and economic development are cheaper than warfare over the long term.

I propose a transformation in the priorities of American foreign and domestic policy. The U.S. government must recognize that American national security is best served by enhancing global security. As a concept, global security encompasses more than simply the lack of war. Global security recognizes that investments in global infrastructure, a clean environment, a minimal standard of living, education, civil liberties, and personal health and safety reap a far greater return on investment than a program of economic domination through military hegemony alone. As a modest first step, I propose the following:

1. The U.S. and other major arms producing countries must stop selling arms and make international arms control a priority. It would not take many countries to adopt this policy to make a significant reduction in the amount of arms proliferation. The U.S. is the single largest producer and exporter of arms in the world. Between 1997-2001, the U.S. accounted for approximately 45% of all arms exported worldwide (Hagelin, Wezeman, Wezeman, & Chipperfield, 2002). Clearly, the U.S. could have an enormous impact even if acting unilaterally. If the U.S. and our NATO allies joined together with Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus, and Japan, arms exports would be reduced to a trickle.
2. The U.S. must stop considering military arms and training as international aid and a tool of diplomacy. For example, the U.S. State Department requested \$4.6 billion of military assistance for foreign governments for fiscal year 2004 of which \$4.414 billion is for arms and only \$385 million is for

“non-proliferation, anti-terror, and de-mining activities.” In contrast, the State Department requested only \$17.2 million for the U.S. Institute of Peace that the State Department says will “strengthen the nation’s capabilities to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts” (Bureau of Resource Management, 2003). A realignment of priorities is clearly needed.

3. The U.S. and other major arms producing countries should buy back arms in exchange for economic and humanitarian assistance - debt forgiveness, infrastructure improvements (like clean water and sewage treatment systems and basic health care), and literacy programs. These economically oriented investments will reduce poverty, raise the quality of life for billions of people, and create goodwill towards the U.S.
4. The U.S. must encourage democratic reform by respecting legitimate electoral results. The U.S. should provide economic and humanitarian aid regardless of whether or not the democratically elected winners match American ideological preferences. The U.S. has supported too many dictators and undermined too many democratically elected governments. If the U.S. truly believes in democracy and the right of self-determination, then American foreign policy must reflect that belief.
5. The U.S. must protect countries that participate in the disarmament and democratization programs. The charter of the United Nations provides one such framework, and the U.S. and its allies should enforce this provision in concert with new or existing regional organizations.
6. All heavily militarized states should agree to reduce arms levels. The U.S. and other states will always have threats to national security - military conflict and terrorism have existed and will continue to exist. I am not advocating the total disarmament of the world. Nor do I believe, however, that it is necessary for the U.S. and the rest of the world collectively to spend nearly a trillion dollars annually on defense. I recommend that the top 15 spenders on defense adopt

a dollar for dollar match program to cut proportionally one dollar for each dollar the rest of the world cuts. This is a modest sum that could cut global defense spending by a maximum of 40%, if all countries outside the top 15 completely dismantled their militaries. The U.S.’s share would amount to a reduction of approximately 45 cents for each dollar the rest of the world cuts from defense spending and maximally would result in a drop of about \$75 billion or slightly more than the increase in the U.S. defense budget since 9/11. Russia’s budget would drop approximately \$13 billion or 26%.

7. The U.S. must redirect its energy policies towards renewable sources. For example, there are thousands of square miles of homes and businesses built on relatively shade-free land in the desert southwest, the lowlands of Florida, and in communities built on clear-cut land all around the U.S. How many kilowatt-hours of power could be generated if the U.S. placed solar arrays on these private homes and businesses?

Some pessimists may claim that these proposals will cost too much when in reality the proposal is at worst budget neutral and likely will save money when fully implemented[26]. Other pessimists will argue that the proposal will not work or that other states will cheat. In response, I suggest that if the U.S. leads by example working closely with its allies through a verifiable inspections program the rewards far outweigh any risks particularly in comparison to the risks involved in the current Bush administration strategy of neo-conservative unilateralism. If anything, my proposal shifts risk from the U.S. to a broader coalition of states. Other states benefit also. OECD states benefit in a similar way to the U.S. by increasing goodwill abroad and reducing the risk of terrorism at home. Developing states benefit by guaranteeing their sovereignty, reducing their military burden, increasing foreign investment and aid, and enjoying an increased quality of life for their citizens. Those states that choose not to participate may accrue short-term benefits but at the risk of long-term isolation.

In summary, despite assuming maximum levels of costs and assuming modest levels of savings, the net cost of my proposal is essentially nothing. As the program is phased-in, structural adjustments in the economy will make lost tax revenues and unemployment a relatively short-term proposition similar in scope to the decline in defense spending during the 1990s. The increases in foreign aid will be more than offset by the reduction in defense budgets and military operational expenses plus increased tax revenues from U.S. companies engaged in building infrastructure or benefiting from additional sales in the developing world. And how can one quantify the benefit of lives spared due to reduced armed conflict, terrorism, and better nutrition and health care?

## CONCLUSION

Foreign policy must respond to the very causes of our current dilemmas. The combination of military, political-economic, and socio-cultural policies the Bush administration employs are causing the very phenomena the world abhors. If the United States is partly responsible for creating the terrorism, violence, and anti-Americanism seen worldwide, the United States needs to adjust its own policies to mitigate them.

President Bush has spoken about building up the U.S. military to a level such that no nation even considers trying to equal America and has requested hundreds of billions of dollars in new defense spending to accomplish this. The administration's mantra seems to be "the beatings will continue until morale improves". Military hegemony instills hate not fear.

The fact is that the U.S. has had military preponderance for years. No nation could contemplate a conventional military conflict with the U.S. even before the increase in defense spending as the U.S. already outspends the next 9 to 25 highest spending nations combined (Skons, Loose-Weintraub, Omitoogun, & Stalenheim, 2002; Hellman, 2002)[27].

The United States is at a crossroads. Currently, the U.S. is on the path of world domination that leads ultimately to the end of U.S. hegemony. It would be far cheaper and enhance peace and security more if the U.S. and other major arms producing countries simply stopped selling arms, stopped considering military arms and training as international aid and a tool of diplomacy, made international arms control a priority, and bought back arms in exchange for economic and humanitarian assistance - debt forgiveness, infrastructural improvements (like clean water and sewage treatment systems and basic health care), and literacy programs - and shifted to alternative energy sources.

The United States spends more than 20 times as much on defense as it does on international aid. And a third of international aid is used to arm and train foreign militaries. Much of this "aid" is used to fight American troops, as it was in Afghanistan and Iraq, or to arm and train opposing nations as in India and Pakistan. It is estimated that it would take only \$22 billion to provide clean water, sanitation, basic health care, and nutrition to the entire world and only \$30 billion to protect all the ecologically sensitive natural resources around the world. Yet, the U.S. will likely spend at least \$225 billion to eliminate Iraq as one potential source of WMD proliferation while risking regional destabilization, undermining global order, and increasing anti-American sentiment around the world.

The United States can continue to choose the path of domination and pay the price of peace and security in blood and billions of dollars wasted or the U.S. can rationally build and implement a new foreign policy regime and reap the social and material benefits of re-enfranchising the world.

## REFERENCES

- Akins, J. K. (1998). *God, Guns, and Guts: Religion and Violence in Florida Militias*. PhD Dissertation, University of Florida.
- Arendt, H. (1968). *Imperialism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich.
- Arrighi, G. (1994). *The Long Twentieth Century*:

- Money, Power, and the Origin of our Times*. London: Verso.
- Arrighi, G. & Silver, B. (1999). *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Associated Press (2004, October 16). *America's Popularity Overseas Dwindles*. Gainesville Sun.
- Bennis, P. (2003). *Before & After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis*. New York: Olive Branch Press.
- Bin Laden, U. (1996). *Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*. Usama Bin Laden [On-line]. Available: [www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration\\_of\\_jihad1.html](http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html)
- Bureau of Resource Management (2003). *International Affairs Function 150: Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request*.
- Bush, G. W. (2001). *Address to Joint Session of Congress. The White House* [On-line]. Available: [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm)
- Chomsky, N. (2003). *Hegemony or Survival*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Department of Defense (2003). *Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline*.
- Elkholm Friedman, K. (2003). "State Classes, the Logic of Rentier Power and Social Disintegration." In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 343-377). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Friedman, J. (2003). "Globalization, Dis-integration, Re-organization: The Transformations of Violence." In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 1-34). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1987). *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Glick Schiller, N. & Fouron, G. (2003). "Killing Me Softly: Violence, Globalization, and the Apparent State." In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 203-248). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Gold, D. (2002). "Appendix 6E. US military expenditure and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review." In A.D.Rotfeld (Ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (pp. 309-322). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hagelin, B., Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T., & Chipperfield, N. (2002). "International Arms Transfers." In A.D.Rotfeld (Ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (pp. 373-402). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2004). *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2003). *The New Imperialism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hellman, C. (2002). *Last of the Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still the World's Largest, and Growing*. Center for Defense Information [On-line]. Available: <http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY03.html>
- Hirsh, M. (2002). "Bush and the World." *Foreign Affairs*, 81, 18-43.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 22-49.
- Inda, J. X. & Rosaldo, R. (2002). *The Anthropology of Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- International Forum on Globalization (2002). *Alternatives to Economic Globalization*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
- Jameson, F. & Miyoshi, M. (1998). *The Cultures of Globalization*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Joseph, F. M. (1959). *As Others See Us: The United States through Foreign Eyes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kaysen, C., Steinbruner, J. D., & Malin, M. B. (2002). "U.S. National Security Policy: In Search of Balance." In C.Kaysen, S. E. Miller, M. B. Malin, W. D. Nordhaus, & J. D. Steinbruner (Eds.), *War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives* (pp. 1-6). Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Kennedy, P. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House.
- Kennedy, P. (1992). "A Declining Empire Goes to War." In C.W.Kegley Jr. & E. R. Wittkopf (Eds.), *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (pp. 344-346). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lechner, F. J. & Boli, J. (2000). *The Globalization Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Nonini, D. M. (2003). "American Neoliberalism, "Globalization," and Violence: Reflections from the United States and Southeast Asia." In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 163-201). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Nordstrom, C. (2004). *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-first Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Ong, A. (1987). *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Reyna, S. (2003). "Imagining Monsters: A Structural History of Warfare in Chad (1968-1990)." In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 279-307). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Rice, C. (2000). "Promoting the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs*, 79.
- Ritzer, G. (2000). *The McDonaldization of Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Skons, E., Loose-Weintraub, E., Omitoogun, W., & Stalenheim, P. (2002). "Military Expenditure." In A.D.Rotfeld (Ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (pp. 231-265). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2003). *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2004). *Recent Trends in Military Expenditure*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [On-line]. Available: [http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex\\_trends.html](http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html)
- Sundar, N. (2004). "Toward an Anthropology of Culpability." *American Ethnologist*, 31, 145-163.
- The White House (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. The White House [On-line]. Available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>
- The White House (2003). *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. The White House [On-line]. Available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>
- Tomlinson, J. (1991). *Cultural Imperialism*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalization and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Turner, T. (2003). "Class Projects, Social Consciousness, and the Contradictions of 'Globalization'". In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 35-66). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Vidal, G. (2002). *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books.
- White, D. W. (1998). "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" *Harvard International Review*, 20, 42-47.
- Wieviorka, M. (2003). *The New Paradigm of Violence*. In J.Friedman (Ed.), *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (pp. 107-139). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- World Islamic Front (2003). "Statement: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders." In M.L.Sifry & C. Cerf (Eds.), *The Iraq War Reader* (pp. 202-204). New York: Touchstone.
- Worley, D. R. (2003). *Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force*, United States Army War College.

## NOTES

[1] I would also like to thank Bryan Byrne, B.J. Brown, Gary Weisel, Paul Magnarella, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments which greatly improved this article.

[2] This was the mandate given the Commission by the United States Congress in Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002. Cited in the National Commission's final report, p. xv.

[3] In Muslim countries, a 2002 poll found that only 15 percent of Egyptians and 12 percent of Saudis had a favorable opinion of the U.S. A 2003 poll found that favorable ratings of the U.S. had dropped from 61 percent to 15 percent in Indonesia and from 71 percent to 38 percent among Muslims in Nigeria from the previous year following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, a 2003 poll found that two-thirds of Muslims surveyed from across the Muslim world (and including NATO member Turkey) feared the U.S. may attack their country (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The figures are not much better elsewhere either. Recent polls conducted in 10 countries around the world found that Israel was the only country where there was a favorable opinion of the U.S. government. In the 9 other countries polled including Canada, France, UK, Spain, Russia, Japan, Australia, Mexico, and South Korea, people had a highly unfavorable opinion of the U.S. government. In contrast to the U.S. government, the American people were viewed more favorably than unfavorably in all 10 countries (Associated Press, 2004).

[4] Bin Laden's August 23, 1996, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," (translation available at [www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration\\_of\\_jihad1.html](http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html)) and the February 23, 1998, statement by World Islamic Front (2003) urging jihad against Jews and Crusaders and signed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri among others are the best known.

[5] I am not suggesting here that al-Qaeda was behind any of these acts of American domestic terrorism or that 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombings are associated directly. I am suggesting here that given the lengthy history terrorism against American targets leading up to 9/11 a terrorist attack of the scale of 9/11 should not have been as unanticipated as it was.

[6] The individuals and groups themselves may or may not rationalize their acts as a response to globalization. Furthermore, I am not arguing that the violence is a legitimate response to the perceived injustices. I am merely suggesting that the violence has common underlying causes.

[7] I will focus primarily on the United States and its policies because the U.S. is the most powerful state economically and militarily and thus disproportionately influences

the rest of the world.

[8] Several volumes on globalization helped inform the brief sketch presented here and may be consulted for more detail (Inda & Rosaldo, 2002; Turner, 2003; Harvey, 2003; Harvey, 1989; Friedman, 2003; Jameson & Miyoshi, 1998; Lechner & Boli, 2000).

[9] A related issue is the extent to which economic globalization supplants local, traditional value systems with western values, e.g., consumerism, materialism, individualism, and secularism that tend to drive capitalist economic systems. You can stay at an American hotel chain, see the latest American blockbuster film, watch CNN and MTV, listen to American pop music on the radio, buy Levi jeans and Nike shoes, and drink a Coke or Pepsi at a local McDonalds or Pizza Hut anywhere in the world. More significantly, however, economic globalization impacts traditional social relations. For example, Aihwa Ong demonstrates the impact on social life and gender relations in Malaysia when the state consciously transforms society along capitalist lines in order to attract foreign investment and the traumatic experience of many young, rural women who relocate in order to work in Japanese-owned factories in free trade zones (Ong, 1987).

[10] For excellent discussions of the problem of over accumulation see Harvey (2003, 1989), Friedman (2003), and Turner (2003).

[11] Following David Harvey (2003), the American ascension to military and economic hegemony can be classified as “capitalist imperialism” that entails the combination of the politics of state and empire as a political project with the processes of capital accumulation in space and time as a political-economic project. Thus, capitalist imperialism links territorial and capitalist logics of power (Arrighi, 1994) sometimes working in concert and sometimes independently. However, in capitalist imperialism, the logic of capital usually though not always dominates the logic of territory (Harvey, 2003).

An interesting question is whether the world is currently dominated by an American Empire or a more decentralized Empire of the sort Hardt and Negri describe (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Hardt & Negri, 2004). In my view, both are currently in competition particularly following the Bush administration’s shift toward neo-conservatism.

[12] There is not enough space here to document fully the relationship between globalization and violence. For further details, I recommend the volume *Globalization the State, and Violence* edited by Friedman (Elkholm Friedman, 2003; Glick Schiller & Fouron, 2003; Nonini, 2003; Reyna, 2003; Wiewiorka, 2003).

[13] This “progressive” ideology has organized states economically and politically since the late nineteenth century and was also used to legitimize colonialism and European imperialism (Arendt, 1968). The violence wrought in the name of progress is extensive. For colonizers and imperialists, violence wrought was largely viewed as a necessary aspect of progress at home and abroad where indigenous

people were being “civilized”. The idea that violence is often necessary to “help” other peoples and other states to progress is explicit in the rhetoric on Iraq. For example, then American Secretary of State Madeline Albright described the 500,000 deaths of Iraqis (mostly children) due to sanctions as “worth it” in a report on the TV show *60 Minutes*. Similarly, during an interview with a 12-year-old Iraqi boy who lost his family and was severely injured during a U.S. bombing who expressed his hopes that no other children suffer like he has suffered, CNN anchor Kyra Phillips responded by asking the doctor who was also interpreting “Doctor, does he understand why this war took place? Has he talked about Iraqi freedom and the meaning? Does he understand it?” (Sundar, 2004).

[14] To a lesser extent, American foreign policy experts also focused on “Confucian” civilization. The influence of Huntington can also be inferred in the Pentagon’s policy of preparing for two major regional wars during the 1990s. It is informative to recall that the two countries the Pentagon used for planning purposes during this period were Iraq and North Korea. Note also that Fukuyama’s argument that the world has reached the end of history with the triumph of capitalism and democracy was tempered by a cautionary note that Islam represents a potential challenge (Fukuyama, 1992).

[15] It is important to note that the list already included the Saudi regime, Hosni Mubarak, Saddam Hussein, and Israel, along with the rulers of several other Arab states. See (Bin Laden, 1996; World Islamic Front, 2003). The credence given to Huntington’s hypothesis should not be underestimated. While I have no direct evidence al-Qaeda was influenced by Huntington, Muslim intellectuals and educated Muslims in general are quite aware of the “Clash of Civilizations” hypothesis. For example, I attended a seminar at the U.S. based Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences where the “Clash of Civilizations” was the topic. Similarly, when I was in Malaysia, I was asked to participate in a forum on the “Clash of Civilizations” hosted jointly by the political science students organization and the debate team at the International Islamic University. I have also been asked about my opinion on the “Clash” hypothesis by other Muslim intellectuals. Clearly, while I find Huntington’s neo-romantic division of the world into a handful of well-defined, competing civilizations unconvincing, it is too early to dismiss Huntington’s influence as Hardt and Negri recently argued (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

[16] 1989 was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into a dozen independent states. The final blow was the economic pressure of the arms race begun by President Reagan. My own sense is that the failure in 1968 of radicals in Western Europe to produce communist revolutions and the repression of left-leaning radicals at that same year’s Democratic National Convention marked the beginning of the end. Once the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, the Soviet economy began to stagnate under Brezhnev, the U.S. and Soviets cooperated on the highly

symbolic ABM treaty and Apollo-Soyuz mission, and the U.S. transformed its economy in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis, the real threat was gone. For a brief synopsis of the demise of the Soviet Union see Harris (1992). For a fuller description of the economic stagnation and then collapse of the Soviet economy see Gregory and Stuart (1990).

[17] It is common to say that the U.S. is the only military superpower left in the post-cold war era, but what does it really mean? Here are a few statistics. In FY 2003, the U.S. spent approximately \$450 billion on national defense accounting for nearly half of all military spending in the world (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004). In 2001, the U.S. Defense Department spent more money than the defense budgets of the next 9 highest spending countries combined and accounted for 36 percent of the money spent on defense by the entire world. The \$48 billion increase in the U.S. defense budget between FY 2002 and FY 2003 is greater than the entire defense budget of any other country (Gold, 2002). According to the Defense Department's 2002 Base Structure Report, the U.S. military has 6,425 military installations including 725 in foreign countries. These are U.S. owned facilities and this number does not include navy flotillas, U.S. embassies, or installations in countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the former Yugoslavia where the U.S. has large numbers of military personnel stationed (Department of Defense, 2003). The U.S. military is also engaged regularly in a variety of missions including training American and foreign militaries, advising foreign militaries engaged in combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, intelligence gathering, deterrence, covert operations, force protection, and overt military combat operations. For example, the Federation of American Scientists lists hundreds of ongoing and completed military operations since the end of WWII (Vidal, 2002). American forces are better prepared than any other military, are deployed around the world, and can take action anywhere and at anytime. These facts on the ground define American military hegemony.

[18] Even the bipartisan 9/11 Commission recognized the role that American foreign policy in the Muslim world played in the success of and popular support for Islamist terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda noting that, "America's policy choices have consequences" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The Commission fell well short of blaming American foreign policy; however, stating merely "American foreign policy is part of the message" conveyed to the Muslim world and that therefore U.S. policies "must be integrated with America's message of opportunity to the Arab and Muslim world" (ibid). It is also important to note that these same policies have also engendered much anti-Americanism outside the Muslim world (see Note iii). Significantly, these policies, particularly the Iraq War, have also split the American citizenry roughly in half.

[19] I must note here that the use of terrorism as a tactic defined as the use or the threat of use of violence against non-combatants for a political purpose is not limited to non-

state actors. Many states have engaged in terrorism at home and abroad thus defined. While an exhaustive list is not possible here, Nazi Germany and the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are paradigmatic cases. Also, Saddam Hussein's violent repression of Kurds and Shiites in Iraq, the Israeli/Lebanese massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila, and Stalin's violent repression of dissent in the Soviet Union are other examples of state-based terrorism.

[20] Vidal (2002) contains extensive excerpts from his correspondence with McVeigh that details many of McVeigh's views. Akins has documented the connections between the ideology and rhetoric of Republican politicians like Gingrich and the Christian right and the militia movement (Akins, 1998). The connection between economic globalization and militant environmentalists is an even clearer case to make.

[21] The ends of the GWOT have been much debated in the recent U.S. Presidential elections. In an interesting twist, Bush criticized Kerry for saying that he looked forward to the day when terrorism was merely a criminal nuisance. Bush called this "pre-9/11 thinking" even though his own policy has the same operational goal (The White House, 2003).

[22] Hardt and Negri (2004) use the term to link the ideas that war is an exception to normal, peaceful periods, the exceptional act of suspending the constitution during war, and specifically American exceptionalism. Though I concur with Hardt and Negri's analysis of exceptionalism, I use the term here in a more limited sense applying it only to the U.S.

[23] Four major schools of thought exist concerning American post-cold war strategic alternatives: (1) primacy, (2) cooperative security, (3) selective engagement, and (4) neo-isolationism (Worley, 2003). The strategy the Bush administration chose is primacy. Primacy advocates contend that international order is best served by ensuring that the United States is the preponderant military power and that the major threat to international order would be a competitor to American military hegemony; thus, no other competitors must arise to balance U.S. power. The cooperative security strategy developed from the earlier concept of collective security that advocated the use of multinational coalitions to confront aggressor nations. Advocates of cooperative security seek to prevent the possibility of nations acquiring the means necessary to become aggressors; thus, the proliferation of WMDs is the greatest threat to peace. A selective engagement strategy entails preventing war between the "great powers" including the G8 and other European nations and preventing WMD proliferation to potentially hostile nations like the "axis of evil". Neo-isolationists argue that U.S. overall security is not threatened either economically or militarily by any other nation and that the threat of terrorism and WMD usage against the U.S. is proportional to U.S. military involvement abroad. Thus, less military involvement abroad equals more security at home.

[24] Rumsfeld quote is from an October 16, 2003 Department of Defense memo cited in the 9/11 Commission

Report, pp. 374-375. (The memo is also available online at [www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm)). Kissinger cited in (Hirsh, 2002).

[25] The rise of another hegemon usually entails a large-scale war and I do not foresee the U.S. peacefully stepping aside.

[26] Total global arms sales during 2000 are estimated at between \$27-33 billion—less than 1% of global trade (Hagelin et al., 2002). The proposal will cost (1) the lost corporate taxes from sales of arms to foreign countries and a reduction in domestic sales plus, (2) the costs associated with unemployment for displaced workers (unemployment insurance, drop in personal income tax, and costs of retraining) plus, (3) the increase in economic and humanitarian assistance. While the costs will be gradually phased in over many years as more countries participate, the figures here reflect maximum annual costs.

The U.S. averages between \$15-28 billion of arms exports each year (Hagelin *et al.*, 2002). Presuming that the U.S. also cuts domestic orders by the same amount including \$4-5 billion from the State Department, a generous 100% profitability, and a 34% federal tax rate plus a 6% state tax rate, the cost to the U.S. government is \$12-22 billion each year. Second, let's assume that this all happens instantaneously and that U.S. arms manufacturers immediately lay off 150,000 employees, that none of these employees ever find work elsewhere despite retraining paid for by the government, and that the U.S. changes its policies and provides unlimited unemployment benefits. The total cost of unemployment insurance, loss in personal income tax revenues, and retraining amounts to less than \$5 billion each year. Third, let's assume that each year the U.S. buys back about \$15 billion worth of arms from countries in the program (until of course there are none left to buy), continues to give the \$4-5 billion formerly given as arms as economic and humanitarian aid, and throws in an additional \$5 billion in aid for democratic countries. The cost is \$25 billion each year. The total cost of this plan is about \$42-52 billion each year. This is equal to or less than the supplemental budget requests for national defense in FY 2003 and FY 2004.

The U.S. will save from (1) a significant decrease in our defense budget from the matching program plus, (2) the elimination of most military aid plus, (3) a long-term decrease in the cost of peacekeeping and war expenses plus, (4) an increase in tax revenues derived from U.S. companies and individuals engaged in building infrastructure and benefiting from higher sales in the developing world plus, (5) a significant decline in anti-Americanism worldwide and a decline in loss of life from armed conflict, terrorist attacks, and from nutrition and health related issues. First, the defense savings from the matching program alone could amount to as much as \$75 billion each year. However, between the match program and voluntary cuts derived from a lower threat level, let's estimate savings of \$37.5 billion

each year (less than the \$48 billion increase between FY 2002 and FY 2003). Second, the U.S. saves \$4-5 billion annually formerly spent for military aid. Third, let's project that the U.S. averages a very modest savings of \$2.5 billion each year in costs associated with peacekeeping and wars (though the deal fell through, the U.S. was willing to purchase Turkey's assistance alone for an invasion of Iraq for as much as \$26 billion). Fourth, let's estimate that the U.S. gains \$2-3 billion in tax revenues from U.S. companies and individuals. And fifth, let's consider the potential benefits of increased goodwill toward the U.S. and a significant decline in loss of life. The solar arrays program can be cost neutral implemented through public-private partnerships that include low interest loan packages to utilities that join the program. In summary, the net cost of my proposal is essentially zero. However, the benefits can be immense.

[27] While the exact number of countries it takes to equal U.S. defense spending varies depending on the source, the year, and the method to convert local currencies into dollars, the significant point is that the U.S. outspends every other country in the world by a factor of at least 6 to 1. To put this in perspective, it would take the combined defense budgets of all of NATO (other than the U.S.), Russia, Japan, and China in order to equal U.S. defense spending (Skons et al., 2002). In contrast, the combined budgets of all multi-national organizations like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc. is less than \$20 billion (Hirsh, 2002).

Copyright of TAMARA: Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science is the property of TAMARA: Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.