The Dualism of Prudence

Załuski, Wojciech Kwarciński, Tomasz

Jagiellonian University | Cracow University of Economics

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Contrary to the rather commonly held opinion that the understanding of prudence (as a certain virtue) has not changed essentially since the ancient times, it is argued in the paper that there are two not only distinct but also incompatible concepts of prudence: the modern – amoral or nonmoral, and the classical (Aristotelian-Th omist) – strictly moral. Th e claim that these concepts are distinct and incompatible implies that ‘modern prudence’ is not part of ‘classical prudence’ but is essentially diff erent from it: one cannot be prudent in both senses (for instance, part of modern prudence is continence/self-control, whereas classical prudence excludes continence/self-control). Apart from the comparison of both concepts of prudence, the paper also provides an analysis of their relations with the so-called ‘prudential values’ as well as of the causes of the evolution (or rather: revolution) in the understanding of prudence which took place in modern philosophy; It is also argued that within ethics which assumes the classical understanding of prudence there is no place for what Sidgwick called the ‘dualism of practical reason’.


Journal Prakseologia 
Volume 2019 
Issue 161 
Type Article 
Language pl
DOI 10.7206/prak.0079-4872_2015_160_28
ISSN 0079-4872