Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem
Domniemanie języka potocznego jako paradygmat interpretacyjny i jego wrogowie w polskiej teorii prawa
Uniwersytet Wrocławski
Abstract
In my paper, I reconstruct Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation. My goal is to show that this theory has the characteristics of a paradigmatic theory because of the importance of the presumption of common language, which is a fundamental element of this theory. This presumption is decisive in shaping the picture of interpretation and, consequently, gives the theory in question the status of a model theory defining a postulated model of legal interpretation. In the paper, I discuss various aspects of this presumption, highlighting its importance in preserving the principle of universal access to practical (legal) discourse. At the same time, I question the views that challenge this presumption by claiming that the language of law is a code accessible only to a cognitively privileged group of professional lawyers.