@article {5814,
	title = {Law in the Snares of the Political. Addressing Rafa{\l} Ma{\'n}ko{\textquoteright}s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication},
	journal = {Krytyka Prawa. Niezale{\.z}ne studia nad prawem},
	volume = {12},
	year = {2020},
	month = {11/2020},
	pages = {109-125},
	abstract = {The paper aims at reconstruction and critical discussion with the main tenets of political theory of adjudication, as presented by Rafa{\l} Ma{\'n}ko in his book, W stron{\k e} krytycznej filozofii orzekania. Polityczno{\'s}{\'c}, etyka, legitymizacja [Towards a Critical Philosophy of Adjudication. The Political, Ethics, Legitimacy]. In the paper, I demonstrate: that the interpretation of the concept crucial for the entire theory {\textendash} which is the concept of political {\textendash} has been chosen by Ma{\'n}ko in an ideological and a priori manner; that the choice above effectively prevents the realisation of the main objective of the book, which is to legitimise adjudication; that the adoption of the ethics of adjudication advocated in the book is {\textendash} in the light of the basic assumptions of that very publication {\textendash} both improbable and hardly acceptable. Finally, I claim that Ma{\'n}ko{\textquoteright}s theory, due to its totality, can distinguish neither between legitimate law and violence, nor between justified and unjustified adjudication. As a result, it loses its critical force. All these problems are not peculiar to Ma{\'n}ko{\textquoteright}s theory, but they are general weaknesses of various versions of critical jurisprudence. },
	issn = {2080-1084},
	doi = {10.7206/kp.2080-1084.398}
}
