@article {5858,
	title = {References to Philosophers in the Polish Case Law},
	journal = {Krytyka Prawa. Niezale{\.z}ne studia nad prawem},
	volume = {11},
	year = {2019},
	month = {12/2019},
	pages = {281-298},
	abstract = {The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship{\textquoteright}s discourse on {\textquotedblleft}judges as philosophers{\textquotedblright} in the likeness of Dworkin{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}Judge Hercules{\textquotedblright}. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions {\textendash} and not so much in the making of them. In the author{\textquoteright}s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.},
	issn = {2080-1084},
	doi = {10.7206/kp.2080-1084.354}
}
