

From (Anti-)Imperialism to (Counter-)Emperialism

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ABSTRACT

i

This article is a critical presentation of the discourse on US imperialism, covering the work of both pro- and anti- imperialists. It presents the contrasting theory of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, to who "U.S imperialism" is far from an accurate description of the current form of sovereign power . Despite the popularization of the notion of a new American imperialism our reality is becoming one of a single network of various forms of sovereignty, novel in scope and intensity, not only colonizing territory, but controlling communication, freedom of movement, knowledge and truth.

This article is a critical presentation of the discourse on US imperialism, covering the work of both pro- and anti- imperialists. This includes a brief account of how the U.S.'s relatively non-violent politicking has very recently given way to an open determination to use and, just as importantly, to advertise its military power. Second, it presents the contrasting theory of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, to whom "U.S imperialism" is far from an accurate description of the current form of sovereign power[1]. Despite the popularization of the notion of a new American imperialism our reality is becoming one of a single network of various forms of sovereignty, novel in scope and intensity, not only colonizing territory, but controlling communication, freedom of movement, knowledge, truth, technics, subjectivity, in short, all the processes of natural and social reproduction: life itself.

The most striking aspect of the standard definition of imperialism is its territoriality: imperialism is popularly understood as 'the policy, practice or advocacy of extension of a nation's power or influence over other territories' (The Chambers Dictionary). By this (modernist) definition one is said to live under imperialist rule if the defense and organizational affairs

of one's nation are unilaterally managed by an alien governmental-military power. Hardt and Negri's contrasting theory of global emperialism[2] is based on the premise that by the late twentieth century, imperialism of the type familiar to all students of nineteenth century history is archaic, if not impossible. They hypothesize instead a (postmodern) mode of power - Empire, the imperial in the singular - a power whose potency derives from its facelessness and flexibility. Its model is not the hierarchy but the network. Its power is not restricted to control of territory. On the contrary, emperialism is deterritorialized. This social-technological change suggests both the necessity and (in the long term) the possibility of the revolutionary re-appropriation of emperial power toward the construction of a post-nationalist, post-capitalist global society.

Hardt and Negri expand on the Foucauldian premise that power has become 'a machinery that no one owns' (Foucault, 1980: 156). When governmental elites (and jihadist terrorists) come to believe that destructive power is the best guarantor of achieving radical social-political change, they misunderstand their own situation. Ultimately, neither group

will be capable of violently imposing their values on the wider world (Hardt, Tamara: ??). Conversely, anti-imperialist refusal of military power is unimaginatively narrow and disappointingly unproductive. Counter-imperialism is borne of the recognition that the power of dissent can be more positively channelled into the constructive demonstration of real alternatives to militaristic and terroristic power.

However, Hardt and Negri do acknowledge the mainstream's accepted truth that we recently have witnessed the reassertion of imperialist power (Hardt, 2005; Negri, *et al.*, 2002). This essay seeks to reconcile the (anti-)imperialist and (counter-)imperialist theories of the organization of social power, with particular focus on the war on terrorism and the recent U.S.-led military campaign in Iraq[3]. It raises the question of whether anti-imperialist social and political theory is better served by treating the recent acceptance of U.S. imperialism as a diversion - possibly the result of Empire's capacity to channel dissent into non-lethal outlets - from any global organization against capital. The U.S. war on Iraq and, indeed, popular protests against it, are damaging to the burgeoning counter-capitalist movement in so far as they divert attention from the contemporary formation of a supra-national empire, which controls immanently, seeks to colonise the entirety of human and non-human life through machinic (automated) control of communication and production, and parasitically co-opts any and all organizational power which seeks to impose limits upon it.

At the risk of invoking inadequate political scales ("right/left", "conservative/radical", "hawk/dove") there are three blocs of opinion on what "U.S. world leadership" means for contemporary social and political reality. The brief review of relevant literature which follows does not claim to be exhaustive. It does however introduce a small, but representative, sample of well-informed opinion.

One bloc believes the world scene is, and should be, characterized by U.S. imperialism (Boot, 2001; Donnelly, 2003; D'Souza,

2002; Kaplan, 2002, 2003; Kaplan and Shelburne, 2003). This bloc is in *Praise of American Empire* and represents *The Hard Edge of American Values*. It proudly understands itself to represent a post-Soviet America restored to full health after a debilitating bout of "Vietnam Syndrome". These works are referred to below as "imperialist" works, authors or positions. They are influential pro-Bush political commentators, who, free of the restraint of democratic accountability, dare to contradict the official position of their counterparts in government that the U.S. has no imperialist project (Wolfovitz and Gardels, 2002). Their views are compatible with those of the *Project for the New American Century*[4]. Imperialist opinion has several closely associated trademarks.

First, the U.S. is shown to be, for all practical purposes, the world leader. The U.S. is simultaneously sole military protector of territorial integrity, main financial backer, chief source of trade, and primary cultural referent to so many nations that collectively they constitute an empire. The many sketches of this world picture are so aesthetically coherent that as a series they even manage to be quite convincing when they make the dubious claim that the U.S. has *accidentally* become the world's most economically, militarily and culturally influential nation. Second, the U.S. empire is presented as the most benign, enlightened and humane empire that ever existed - a heroic empire. Third, therefore, the landscape is such that the prevention and/or elimination of any threat to U.S. liberal empire is universally beneficial, both morally and practically. Nationalist - "America first" - foreign policy concepts such as "full spectrum dominance", unilateralism and preventative war are so commonly evoked and defended in their writings that this most "neo" of imperialisms should be seen as having an unusually consistent imagery. This, perhaps, helps explain the large and enthusiastic crowds that their ideological artistry attracts.

In contrast, the central images of anti-imperialist writings - dialogue, interdependence, multilateralism, mutual respect, global justice - are compatible with those found in

the emerging - though not always coherent - discourse on how economic globalization may (or may not) become post-nationalism in the political sphere (Habermas, 2001)[5]. To some extent, the anti-imperialist does recognize the much broader and *tendentially post-national* imperialism that Hardt and Negri focus our attention on. However, mainstream anti-imperialism has not yet taken seriously the urgency of counter-imperialist theory and projects. The anti-imperialist position produces an ugly, vulgar, rendering of the imperialist's landscape which can only perpetuate the increasingly defunct idea that power exists only in its most obvious forms: military-power, national-power, state-power.

The anti-imperialist agrees with the imperialist that the U.S. is currently attempting to fulfil the guardianship duties of an imperialist power, but believes this is contrary to the interests of both the U.S. and the wider world. Works by retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark (2003), John Newhouse (2003) and Scott Ritter (2003) represent the mainstream of anti-imperialist argument within the U.S. Their opposition is especially revealing because they are military, government and intelligence insiders respectively. They oppose recent U.S. actions in Iraq by arguing that it was a) unnecessary given the over-exaggerated Iraqi threat to U.S. "homeland security" and, b) a diversion from the urgent war on global terrorism. They believe that imperialism of the sort currently being attempted in Iraq is unnecessary and futile.

Those who accept the reality of U.S. imperialism from a critical position also include Cox, (2003), Hendrickson (2002), Hiro (2003), Mahajan (2003), Simons (2002) and Walker (2003). These are concerned political theorists of U.S. foreign policy and overseas activity. Collectively they argue that the unprecedented economic and military power of the U.S. in the post-soviet world has been achieved because of its traditional commitment to co-operation, delegation, coalition building, resource-sharing and compromise. U.S. imperialism threatens the very achievement - "the American Way"

- that its advocates claim explicitly to defend. Taken together, these works argue that imperialism amounts to a blasphemy against the U.S. political tradition and the U.S. constitution.

Secondly, anti-imperialists express historically informed doubts about the newly explicit - and allegedly "benign" - imperialist project by reminding us of a series of U.S. interventions that very definitely cannot be considered benign, liberal or pacifist - most notably in various parts of Latin America, but recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recent events in Iraq are viewed critically by anti-imperialists because of a sense of shame that the U.S. does not currently treat others as it expects to be treated itself. This is especially so since it has been confirmed to non-plussed observers the world over that the Iraqi military, pre-invasion, were incapable of striking Israel, never mind the U.S., with any form of weapon, never mind biological or chemical weapons. The war on Iraq is opposed because it was built with hypocrisy and cemented with exaggeration. The numerically prominent role that Saudi Arabian's played in the tragedies of 911 is frequently and very rightly raised as an example of the U.S.'s wilful amnesia when it comes to upholding global justice. If the invasion of Iraq is a representative model for American leadership of the movement toward global democracy and liberal society, say the anti-imperialists, the project is doomed to a tragic and spectacular collapse.

The third distinct position on U.S. imperialism recognizes the partial validity of the dual pro- and con- discourse on imperialism but shows that imperialism - based as it is on state-centric sovereignty over territory and enforced by military power - is presently in the process of being replaced by imperialism; a global capitalism powered by a non-state-centric, hybrid form of sovereignty, enforced by multiple and constantly evolving controlling mechanisms, including the production of subjectivity and meaning.

U.S. IMPERIALISM: RELUCTANT, ACCIDENTAL AND TEMPORARY

Historically, imperialism has meant 'any situation in which one monarchy or state was in a position to give the law to the others' (Hendrickson, 2002: 3). Gradually, since the break up of the Soviet Union, and more rapidly since the declaration of al-Qaeda-style terroristic warfare as "the new communism", American imperialism has come to be considered a social fact. The war on terror is largely being fought on American terms, globally. Pro- and anti-imperialists are equally keen to emphasise that rarely has the U.S "given the law" so effortlessly to so many nations as it does now.

Only very recently "U.S. imperialism" was a concept most commonly associated with "radical" critics. Writing immediately before the attacks of September 11th 2001 Ricks noted that until recently those who labelled the U.S. "imperialist", meant it to be oppositional and insulting (Ricks, 2001)[6]. However, it is clear that around the turn of the millennium the concept began to be unashamedly employed by the so-called "conservative right" in the mainstream press[7]. As Cox remembers: 'what many of them appeared to be suggesting was quite startling: namely that we should start calling things by their right name [and] drop the pretence that America is not an Empire (Cox, 2003: 8). Contemporary arguments along the lines that 'America has become an empire...' (D'Souza, 2002) seek to convince "the American People" that 'the entire question hangs not on whether an empire exists, but on whether or not the empire is benevolent' (Mahajan, 2003: 28).

The U.S.'s currently imperialist foreign policy is justified as the necessary consequence of having unprecedented influence over world affairs. *The Project for the New American Century* is founded on the premise that U.S. imperialism is the inevitable reality of the post-soviet world;

"the fact of unprecedented American power is hardly in dispute...right now all the other navies in the world

combined could not dent American maritime supremacy...the fundamental premise of the Bush Doctrine is true: The United States possesses the means - economic, military, diplomatic - to realize its expansive geopolitical purposes... Any comprehensive U.S. "threat assessment" would conclude that the normal constraints of international politics - counterbalancing powers - no longer immediately inhibit the exercise of American might" (Donnelly, 2003).

With quasi-religious conviction in his socio-political analyses and policy recommendation, and contrary to Hardt and Negri, Donnelly believes that opponents of the idea of U.S. empire 'are arguing with reality, not with him' (cited in Ricks, 2001). From this basis in the hard fact of U.S. "primacy" imperialism is deduced to be the only available policy for a uniquely sovereign nation, whether it be named as such or not[8].

Enthusiasts for American imperialism habitually define it as (thus far) benign and liberal by pointing to its relative restraint. D'Souza almost invites us to thank the U.S. for being so modest in its ambitions: 'America is an abstaining superpower. It shows no real interest in conquering the rest of the world, even though it can' (D'Souza 2002). U.S. military action is always liberal in intention, although the U.S. refuses to take the risk of setting a pacifist example;

"We're talking about the United States serving as an organizing principle for the gradual expansion of civil society around the world. And making moral statements simply is not enough to spur that expansion. You also need military power, and you have to periodically show that you are willing to use it" (Kaplan and Shelburne, 2003).

Other makers of *The Case for American Empire* immediately after 911 called for a dramatic demonstration of that will to make a powerful defense of American world-leadership and a clear statement of moral principle: 'The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation' (Boot, 2001). They were not shy in naming the necessary policy: 'U.S. imperialism - a liberal

and humanitarian imperialism, to be sure, but imperialism all the same' (ibid).

Like all monarchs, America is an unelected leader. No doubt, all Kings experience right, rule and responsibility as an accident of birth, of inheritance. America is no different. Debaters talk of "accidental empire" or a "reluctant imperium", often connecting the necessity of empire ("imperialism whether we like it or not") to the Hobbesian obligation to provide an oasis of security in an antagonistic world. As Kaplan characteristically explains it:

"Very few empires set out to become empires. What tends to happen is that through military and social dynamism, they become very strong economically and militarily as other places weaken, and they find themselves in a gradual position of dominance. As they increasingly see themselves threatened, they go out and do things not for the sake of conquest, but for the sake of their own security at home" (Kaplan and Shelburne, 2003).

Reluctant imperialists tend to hold to a revisionist version of history which imagines that America's winning of the cold war was just the happy outcome of a potentially calamitous situation rather than the victorious result of intense and decades-long investment across economic, military and scientific fields[9].

Even Cox, an anti-imperialist historian, traces the coronation of the U.S. as world's Monarch not just to the collapse of Sovietism, but to the contingency of the Second World War;

"By 1945 this most innocent of countries, with apparently little liking for the idea of power, and even less for running the world, happened to be in charge of most of the world's economic resources, the majority of its military capabilities and a network of bases stretching across two oceans and four continents" (Cox, 2003: 15).

Whichever historical marker we prefer, in the discourse on accidental empire, imperialist policy is presented as the only wise response to contingent political realities.

Cox contextualizes this renewed willingness to "go out and do things". It indicates that the era in which the U.S. 'put all of its enemies on probation' is over (ibid: 4). The U.S. has 'probably overcome that which many people once thought to be a permanent American affliction: the so-called Vietnam Syndrome' (ibid: 4). General Clark confirms that this cultural change has occurred within the military and had catalyzed the rightward shift of U.S. politics well before 911 (Clark, 2003: 101, 168). While it is not at all certain that the U.S. public thinks this is a positive change (especially given the drip-drip torture of almost daily fatalities in the U.S. protectorates, and intensifying global resentment of the U.S.)[10] those who live in the Bush administration's ideosphere certainly have faced their imperialistic "responsibilities" with renewed militaristic confidence.

The 1991 Gulf War occurred just a few years after the collapse of Sovietism. That is, it did not occur in a context where the U.S. felt convinced that it was the sovereign power to such an extent that it could explicitly and consciously strike the first blow[11]. The current war is occurring in such a context. It marks a break with the American strategic tradition which had informed U.S. policy throughout the decades of the cold war.

Hendrickson (2002) represents a loud voice in U.S. and world opinion when he recounts how the curing of Vietnam Syndrome and the turn to the imperialist policy of waging preventative wars is at best a break with the post-WWII political tradition, and at worst, is antithetical to the U.S. constitution. He argues that after a decade of adjustment to the post-Soviet world, catalyzed by the shock of 911, the U.S. has begun to break with its own traditions in foreign policy and military deployment. The wars on Afghanistan and Iraq were/are preemptive wars[12] and there is little doubt that pro-imperialists believe this doctrine is necessary, legal, and just.

However, this shift brings the U.S. into the company of its old enemies: 'In the epoch of the world wars, doctrines of preventative

war were closely identified with the German and Japanese strategic traditions, not with that of the United States' (Hendrickson, 2002: 1). Until the PNAC-inflected attitude[13] of today's American policy-makers and diplomatic community became the norm, 'hostility to any situation of unbounded power was a staple of constitutional thought' (ibid: 2). Hendrickson notes that it was such staples of American politics which meant that post-WWII America rejected universal empire - empire in the name of humanity - in favour of containment of Stalinist Russia's own bid for universality. Post-WWII, 'At the moment of truth, America rejected both isolationism and imperialism', indeed, they actively 'created an array of international institutions that embedded American power in a system of reciprocal restraints' (ibid: 3). As we have seen Donnelly (2003) quite cheerfully argue, "counterbalancing powers" to U.S. power are now understood to be somewhere between expendable and non-existent.

Imperialists are not unaware of the need to pre-empt Hendrickson's objection to the rapid and radical ditching of the American foreign policy tradition. An attractive way to garner support for imperialist policies such as the allegedly "preventative" invasion of Iraq is to place a time limit on the newly-founded imperialist era; 'Unlike 19th-century European colonialists, we would not aim to impose our rule permanently' (Boot, 2001). Similarly pitching himself as an astute realist, as opposed to a power-drunk colonial adventurer, Kaplan attempts to steady anti-imperialist nerves with a dose of reflexive caution:

"if this era of reluctant imperium is to leave a lasting global mark, we must know what we are up to; we must have a sense that supremacy is bent toward a purpose and is not simply an end in itself...our policy makers...are charged with the job of running an empire that looks forward to its own obsolescence" (Kaplan, 2003).

Imperialists happily characterize the imposition of alien rule over national territories as in some sense always reviving monarchic forms of government; 'Once we have deposed Saddam, we can impose an American-led,

international reGENCY in Baghdad, to go along with the one in Kabul' (Boot, 2001). Boot aims to ease the discomfort that Americans - by constitution - should feel with the role of monarch by invoking the age-old figure of the enlightened despot. He simply invites protesters - both at home and in the U.S. protectorates - to trust in American values to triumph in the long run, even if some unpleasant methods have to be used in the short-term[14].

Hardt and Negri's synthetic theory of imperial power is characterized by the rule of a supra-national hybrid sovereignty that encompasses the global population, knows no borders or bounds and unifies every living thing into a single world-system (see below). By contrast, U.S. imperialism seems meek: humane, state-based, territorially bounded and temporary. Kaplan's America-first position is common to all resurrections of modernity's empire-is-our-duty fantasy and whether or not we accept Hardt and Negri's analyses, Kaplan's argument is thoroughly nostalgic, almost quaint:

"By sustaining ourselves first, we will be able to do the world the most good. Some 200 countries, plus thousands of nongovernmental organizations, represent a chaos of interests. Without the organizing force of a great and self-interested liberal power, they are unable to advance the interests of humanity as a whole" (Kaplan, 2003).

U.S. imperialism is intended to provide the 21st century world with a chaos-defeating "organizing force", a supra-national Leviathan which "writes the terms" for the establishment of a stable global society to come:

"For a limited period the United States has the power to write the terms for international society, in hopes that when the country's imperial hour has passed, new international institutions and stable regional powers will have begun to flourish, creating a kind of civil society for the world" (ibid).

In short, the extremely simple premise of the imperialist project is the "realist" understanding that power is currently (and contingently) distributed in such a way that humanity's fate lies in the contemporary U.S.'s capacity to establish a secure economic and

political environment, globally. If it succeeds, wealth and peace for all. If it fails, terror, anarchy, and poverty.

This worldview anticipates the coming of a world without need of nation-based policing and security provision (enabled by both technological development - some form of global automated missile defence system - and the evolution of a truly united trans-national peacekeeping and humanitarian military), but believes (or claims to believe) that *the world is not yet ready* for such a dispersal of power[15]. Until it is - and it seems clear that only the U.S. can possibly certify the world “ready” for a properly global order - then the U.S. *must* be imperialist.

U.S. IMPERIALISM AND IRAQ

Of course, the U.S. war on Iraq was pitched as being as necessary as the U.S.’s imperialist role. Either it was necessary at the level of universal morality - Saddam Hussein’s regime should no longer be appeased, but removed, for the good of the repressed population of Iraq - or it was necessary on the practical level - Saddam Hussein possesses both weapons of mass destruction and the intention to employ them against American targets[16]. And the war on Afghanistan was necessary to destroy al-Qaeda’s terroristic potential. Less often heard was the defense of the wars as being symbolically or ideologically necessary. However, General Clark defines “modern war” in general as being primarily the delivery of a disciplining image of intent and power[17].

On the material level, the U.S. (and U.K) “won” the war, in the sense that Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship was indeed deposed from government, and won quickly. The qualitative and quantitative asymmetry of the forces of the “warring” nations made the victory so inevitable that it offends Clark’s dignity as a “gentlemanly” warrior; ‘The Iraqi’s were being set up...This was not going to be a “fair fight”’ (Clark, 2003: 40). This wasn’t a war with Iraq, but war on Iraq. As another opponent of U.S. imperialism noted, Iraq was ‘eminently beatable’, unlike

nuclear-capable North Korea (Newhouse, 2003: 37). In part, this was because U.S. plans for Iraq were being executed long before the official ground invasion. Military preparations for recent actions had begun immediately after the 1991 Gulf War; ‘General plans had been in place for a decade’ (Clark, 2003: 9). There had been ‘ongoing air strikes into the northern and southern no-fly zones in an effort to prepare the battlefield by ripping apart Iraqi air defenses, communications, command and control, and long-range artillery and missiles *commencing in mid-2002*’ (ibid: 12-13 my emphasis; see also Simons, 2002).

Further, the decisive battle of the war had been waged continuously for 12 years. The war on Iraq was won mainly on the economic front - the Iraqi prey was killed slowly (by constriction rather than a bite) with sanctions on trade which are widely recognized to have caused tens of thousands of deaths and massive damage to civilian infrastructure throughout Iraq (Arnove, *et al.*: 2003; Hiro, 2003). It is more accurate to talk of one long war sandwiched between two slices of military action than of two separate wars.

And so Clark, in Baudrillardian fashion, characterizes the recent invasion as media war. He understands media war not as a political, but as a *military* task: ‘Distinctive approaches to the use of public information and its consequences are as much a part of the battle plan as the troops on the ground’ (Clark, 2003: xiv). Live global reporting of U.S. imperialism in action was an integral aspect of the war, not simply the issuing of propaganda after the event. He defines the purpose of modern wars in general, and especially wars such as this one on an economically and militarily crippled nation, as being to deliver images of spectacular power. Fortunately, the media war was won too. To both pro- and anti- opinion globally,

“...one perception was common: The U.S. military was so superior as to be virtually unchallengeable on the field of battle: Agile, fast-moving, hard-striking, air-land-sea capable, the U.S. armed forces would brook no serious rival... This was a military that could rewrite the boundaries of what force could

achieve. This was an armed force that made a new kind of empire appear inevitable” (Clark, 2003: 162-163).

The production and global broadcast of a constant advertisement of the inevitability of U.S. world-leadership - the reverse of the image broadcast by al-Qaeda on 9/11 - was the true purpose of the war. The “shock and awe” phase of the war was no more than an archaic demonstration of sovereign power - something akin to the demonstration of the definitive sovereign power - power to take life - which Michel Foucault (1991) described. Clark does not say so outright, but it is clear that he believes Iraq was targeted not on the basis of the threat it posed its enemies, but because of Iraq’s relative lack of military strength.

Since 9/11 America has needed to look as if it has an empire. This appearance, arguably, clouds over the newer postmodern forms of sovereignty. Opposition to the recent war on Iraq has been far more mainstream than previous - often naively pacifist - anti-war protests. As U.S. imperialism has become explicit - complete with rational justifications (it is the duty of the powerful, it is the most benevolent imperialism ever conceived, etc) - so has anti-U.S.-imperialism. As we will see, there is a possibility that both proponents and opponents of U.S. imperialism have uncritically accepted that U.S. imperialist/military power is the highest expression of power in today’s world.

EMPERIALISM: IMMANENT, NETWORKED AND SUPRA-NATIONAL

From the very first page of *Empire*[18], Hardt and Negri define the constitution of the world in opposition to the imperialist, and equally the anti-imperialist, understanding of the current manifestations, locations and distributions of power. Against the (anti-)imperialists’ belief that power operates transcendently - from above or outside - power as ordering, bullying, killing, excluding, working with the authority of divinity, they develop a counter-emperialist theory which recognises that power also operates immanently - from within social subjects, production and language - power as creating,

enabling, permitting, seducing. Their theory of empire and emperialism removes what they call the ‘conspiracy theory of globalization’ in which:

‘order is dictated by a single power and a single centre of rationality transcendent to global forces, guiding the historical development according to a conscious and all-seeing plan’ (Empire: 3, original emphasis)

and replaces it with a theory in which ‘[e]mperial sovereignty, in contrast, is organized not around one central conflict but rather through a flexible network of microconflicts’ (ibid: 201). Emperialism is what we have when ‘Power can be reconstituted by a whole series of powers that regulate themselves and arrange themselves in a network’, and when ‘Sovereignty can be exercised within a vast horizon of activities’ (ibid: 162).

Where imperialists see a role for the United States as an “organizing force” and anti-imperialists tend to believe that the United Nations is the legitimate organizer of the international political scene, Hardt and Negri prefer to emphasise how sovereign power is no longer the monopoly of nations, or even the exclusive property of multi-national political bodies[19]. Emperialism ‘operates through a different type of sovereignty and does not rest on the nation and its borders in the same way [as imperialism did]’ (Hardt, *et al.*, 2002a: 180). The relative wealth of nations is not solely determined by conflicting nation-based political processes but also by extra-democratic, supra-national political and economic processes of production, exchange, speculation and regulation: the ‘constitutional functions have been displaced to another level’ (*Empire*: 309).

National governments and institutions, including those that profess to imperialist responsibilities ‘remain extremely important’ (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 238) but have collectively undergone a mutative process such that their powers and roles are interchangeable with, and to some extent indistinct from, non-nation-based and non-governmental bodies. The two historical loci of imperialist power - the

trading corporation and the national military bureaucracy

“have been transformed within the order of Empire. At the highest level, one could say that only Empire (and no longer any nation-state) is capable of sovereignty in the full sense”(Hardt and Negri, 2001: 238).

Emperialism is as trans-national as capital:

“...capital has globalized the system of sovereignty without identifying itself with any single nation-state...from the standpoint of any stock exchange or from any multinational corporation it is clear that capital has no country and in fact resists the control of nation-states” (ibid: 239).

EMPERIALISM: REAL SUBSUMPTION, CYBORGS, AND BIOPOLITICS

The writing of *Empire* was inspired by the apparent novelty of the 1991 Gulf War which led Hardt and Negri to question the validity of the concept “U.S. imperialism” (Hardt, *et al.*, 2002a: 191). They start from the premise that emperial power is not exclusively militarily strength: ‘one shouldn’t mistake military might for all of power’ (Hardt, *et al.*, 2002b: 63). They began to see the reality and power of postmodern sovereignty as more invasive, more pervasive, much more complex than anything that (modernist, regressive) imperialists and anti-imperialists recognise.

Empire can be considered an explication of the social-theoretical claim that in the transition from modernity to postmodernity, ‘there is progressively less distinction between inside and outside’ (*Empire*: 187). This is also a claim that emperialism amounts to an ‘ontological mutation’ (ibid: 215; Hardt, 2005), a new era in the history of human society and in the history of ecology (Negri, 2003: 255). Of the many implications of this claim only two can be presented here. The first is that anti-imperialist politics and theory is effectively defunct, despite attempts at their revival in the context of the war on jihadist terrorism. The second is that counter-emperialist politics is biopolitics, or cyborg politics. The former is about protest against, and refusal of, power. The latter is

about re-appropriation of, and re-organization of, power.

Firstly, (anti-)imperialism should be considered defunct because imperialism was about the extension of capitalist production (and exploitation) to formally pre-capitalist regions (in Marx’s terms, the process of ‘formal subsumption’). Today, however, all prior or alternative modes of production have been strangled out of existence. We know we are now fully within the process of real subsumption;

“exploitation can no longer be localized and quantified. In effect, the object of exploitation and domination tend not to be specific productive activities but the universal capacity to produce” (*Empire*: 209),

‘...today more than ever, as productive forces tend to be completely de-localized, completely universal, they produce not only commodities but also rich and powerful social relationships’ (ibid: 209-210).

Biopolitical emperialism arrives when ‘capital becomes more intensive than extensive’ (ibid: 255), when the process of formal subsumption is already complete, when production and social reproduction have moved beyond the disciplinary institutions of the European imperialist nation. In the terms of Foucault and Deleuze, both ‘the single point of sovereign rule and even the plural archipelago of disciplinary institutions have been distributed throughout the networks of the society of control’ (Hardt, *et al.*, 2002a: 192). Social reproduction - production of “docile subjects” - long ago broke the limits of the home or school, such that society in general has become a social factory, an apparently automated, self-maintaining, social machine.

‘Empire operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of the social world. Empire not only manages a territory and a population but also creates the very world it inhabits’ (*Empire*: xv).

Under empire, not only manual labor, but any and all co-operative and communicative practices (in the sciences, the arts, sports,

criminality) may be subsumed by parasitical capital. Biopower is what we have when life itself is productive, when production becomes immanent to life, when 'reproduction and the vital relationships that constitute it themselves become directly productive' (ibid: 364). When 'Capital has [already] become a world' (ibid: 386) imperialist power of the modern form is no longer necessary[20].

It is no longer (if it ever was) national militaries and national economies which ultimately control the global social landscape. Modern imperialism of the nineteenth century model of competing territorially-expanding national economies is replaced by the postmodern emperialism of a single hybrid (bio)power exercised through the combined capacity for immanent control of a wide variety of globally-dispersed military, scientific, political, philanthropical, juridical and corporate (defense, banking, mining, agricultural, pharmaceutical, entertainment) elites[21].

"The complex apparatus that selects investments and directs financial and monetary manoeuvres determines the new geography of the world market, or really, the new biopolitical structuring of the world" (Empire: 32).

(Anti-)imperialist theories of power which do not recognize that 'economic production and political constitution tend increasingly to coincide' do not have an adequate consciousness of 'Empire and its regime of biopower' (ibid: 41).

Emperialism is characterized by real subsumption, a process which - as well as producing the diverse range of subjectivities - takes the power of (capitalist) production beyond the social, and is constantly industrializing or humanizing the previously natural. Emperialism seeks to control the ecological and the biological too.

Imperialism destroyed wilderness and plundered natural resources (Mackenzie, 1988). Modernity's imperialists understood themselves as Lords over their virgin territories, reaping the pure fruits of the new-found Edens

(Grove, 1995) and manipulating the environment from on high (Anker, 2001). Postmodernity's emperialist sciences mean the end of the purity of the natural and the social (Haraway, 1991). The "natural world" that was once simply ransacked by marauding botanist-explorers is now privatized (that is, bought inside the world of capital) by marauding bioscience enterprises as part of a bulk package which also contains the medicinal knowledge of Amazonian shamans, against the counter-emperialist intentions of the bioprospecting scientists themselves (Christian, 2003). Across various domains of post-industrial life emperialism is seizing the potentials of the humanization of the biological and putting them to blatantly inequitable and unjust purposes (Shiva, 1998; Bowring, 2003). At ground level, medical and agricultural technoscience is conducting various and multiple extra-democratic projects in the creation of post-natural (cyborg) life (Rose, 2001; Haraway, 1997). At the planetary level, global industry and post-industry has rapidly bought humanity into a new era in the history of ecology: the earth is permanently a human-machine hybrid, a 'machine that is full of life' (*Empire*: 365). The full complement of twentieth century sciences, when fully subsumed by capitalism into material and social reproduction,

"constitute a new "nature" (that is a new "artefact") - a second, third, enumerable natures (artefacts), but they always, and at once, constitute a new "subject" - second, third, enumerable subjects. (For this reason it is said in postmodernity that the new subject becomes cyborg or technological artefact... this present transformation, that of the man-machine, is in the real sense of the word, that of the cyborg; and the nature that surrounds the subject is also cyborg...)" (Negri, 2003: 255, emphases adjusted).

Through the exploitation of general intellect Empire hybridizes and co-produces across the entire subjective and objective lifeworld.

As various Foucauldians have recognized, 'all technology is biotechnology' (O'Neil, 1986: 72) and 'technoscience is civics' (Haraway, 1997: 114). Similarly, counter-emperial cyborg politics begins with the following

premise: 'all that which is political is biopolitical' (Negri, 2003: 234). Empire is immeasurably more productive, not exactly "more powerful", but more universal than anything (anti-)imperialism can imagine.

EMPERIALISM, IRAQ AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Even when limited, traditional, national/military power is exercised in the post-cold war world, the theory of imperialism is no longer an adequate explanation. 1991's military coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the first war in which the U.S. had acted, a) *primarily* on behalf of the imperial regime, and b) *primarily* as a supra-national police force. The Gulf war:

"presented the United States as the only power able to manage international justice, not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right...The U.S. world police acts not in imperialist interest but in [e]mperial interest" (Empire: 180 original emphasis).

Writing in *Empire*, before September 11th 2001, and before the imperialist turn in U.S. politics, Hardt and Negri suggested that 'the history of imperialist, inter-imperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over...every [e]mperial war is a civil war, a police action' (ibid: 189). The U.S. war in Vietnam is seen as both an imperial and imperialist war - both fitting in with a 'global political strategy to defend the "free world" against communism' but also displaying 'all the violence, brutality and barbarity befitting any European imperialist power' (ibid: 178). Given the U.S.'s subsequent reluctance to attempt imperialist projects, and the collapse of Sovietism as an imperialist enemy, Vietnam 'might be seen as the final moment of the imperialist tendency' (ibid).

However, 911 was a 'rupture in [e]mperial management, and one that takes place within the process of building the [e]mperial network' (Negri, *et al.*, 2002: 187). America's military (re)action in Afghanistan and Iraq 'involves a suspension of the process, a setback, a block' (ibid: 188). The overcoming of "Vietnam syn-

drome" is an untimely regression to the dual - imperialist and imperial - role that the U.S. unsuccessfully attempted to play in Vietnam. In fact, attempts to re-impose the borders, divisions and hierarchies of the imperialist and cold-war ages and to re-centre power in the United States are equally as damaging to imperialism as the equivalent attempt by Islamist terrorists to block liberalization/ globalization (to defeat "the infidels") and to re-centre power in the Islamic states.

Hardt and Negri, despite tending toward the Fukuyama end of the Fukuyama-Huntington scale, now accept the apparent validity of the view that the war on terror has, at least in part, the character of an inter-imperialist war - even a "clash of civilizations"[22]. As recognized by Giorgio Agamben (an author who has a prominent place in Hardt and Negri's account) the U.S.'s revival of imperialism and al-Qaeda's genocidal violence, form a 'single deadly system' (Agamben, 2001). Post-invasion, it is now all too clear that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was the double invasion of Iraq by the American military and anti-American jihadists; the U.S. has created a magnet for al-Qaeda in Baghdad. While we should hesitate before arguing that the U.S.'s and al-Qaeda's war can be fairly seen as 'symmetrical terror' (Venn, 2002: 128), less problematic is the assertion that there is a 'clandestine complicity of opponents' (Agamben, 2001); both "sides" defend their use of force in apocalyptic terms - with more or less explicit claims to have divine sponsorship - as a war between order and chaos, good and evil; both sides seek "world domination" as the only way of securing their political and cultural traditions from hostile alien forces; both sides have considerable financial wealth - it is a war between the super-rich and the becoming-rich (Hardt, 2005). Sitting somewhere between Fukuyama and Huntington, Hardt sees the war on terror as 'a clash between various elements of the global hierarchy for relative position within it' (Hardt, 2005). It is the U.S.'s defense of a privileged position within empire, against attackers who seek to win that privilege; 'it can be asserted that terrorism is the double of empire' (Negri,

et al., 2002: 190) in the sense that imperialists and jihadists seek not to replace emperialism, but to direct it toward their own ends.

Nowhere is the complicity of U.S. imperialism and Jihadist terrorism clearer than in their mutual reliance on the co-production of fear. Real-time images of the collapse of the World Trade Centre and of the “shock-and-awe” bombing of Kabul and Baghdad form a single terror-spreading system. These mutually-reinforcing spectacles of fear act as public violence always has: ‘the spectacle universalizes fear throughout society’ (*Empire’s* inserts: 206),

“What the spectacle says to us, in a perfectly Hobbesian idiom, is that our world is a dangerous place and if we are to live together in society the only alternative to constant fear is a strict obedience to sovereign power” (ibid: 207).

When General Clark notes that the media war (on terror) was won in Afghanistan and in Iraq (Clark, 2003: 162-163) he is merely expressing his satisfaction that the U.S. had managed to induce as much fear as al-Qaeda had done on September 11th 2001. Anyone who has followed the Israel-Palestinian conflict over the last half century will readily accept that when national militaries and guerrilla-terrorists wage war there is no singular author of the resulting fear.

The primary value of this process of the co-production of fear is that the ability to televisually provoke fear in populations is almost guaranteed to give the appearance of power. The appearance of direct power (that is, the possession of virtual power) is increasingly impossible for nation states to achieve in the age of emperial sovereignty, although it is relatively easy for suicidal terrorists. Ultimately, the equivalence of U.S. imperialism and anti-U.S. jihadism lies in the futility of any territorially-based attempt to violently impose rule and hierarchy on the global multitude. Where anti-imperialists are convinced that such a possibility may be realized, and are beholden to that fear, a counter-emperialist politics affirms the possibility of constructing societies antithetical

to both militarism and terrorism. Rather than engage in spiralling wars of spectacular violence, we counter-emperialists

“must, on the contrary, live together in society, cope with the very real dangers of the contemporary world, and wrestle with the terror of the spectacle. We really have no option other than to confront the fear of the society of the spectacle head on and create somehow the bases of a new hope” (*Empire’s* inserts: 207).

Terrorists and U.S. imperialists apparently believe that their use of force as a machine by which to inject fear, obedience and control into the multitudes can (and will) elevate them to the position of global sovereign power. How wrong they are! They believe they are fighting for the keys to the global war machine, but the keys they fight for do not start the engines of power.

We will return to the hopes and constituent power of the multitudes below, but first we need to see why U.S. imperialism and Islamist imperialism (if this is an acceptable characterization of the motivation behind al-Qaeda’s terrorism) are said to be equally “*counter to the interests of today’s global elites*” (Hardt, 2005, my emphasis).

Today’s wars represent a slow-down in the development of emperial sovereignty, a period of contestation and adjustment. Despite the description of the war on terror as of the appearance of an inter-imperialist war Hardt and Negri believe that

“it is [still] no longer possible to speak of “American imperialism”. There exist, quite simply, groups, elites who hold the keys of exploitation and, as a consequence, the keys to the war machine...Naturally, this process is rife with conflict and will necessarily be so for a long time...however...in the end, what is still - as always - at work is collective capital” (Negri, *et al.*, 2002: 190).

Within the passage to emperial reality, Hardt and Negri take very seriously that (as we have seen above) in its attempts to protect its national security against the threat of suicide bombing, “the Bush Administration since Sep-

tember 11th is attempting to create a new US imperialism...[and] to create itself as the center of global affairs', as 'A hegemon' (Hardt, 2005). However, although 'The United States is once again making military organizational strength a central theme...[attempting] a military structuring of the world according to a sort of authoritarian neo-liberalism' (Negri, *et al.*, 2002: 191), within the context of Empire the contemporary U.S. (and its "double" - terrorism) must still be understood as only "*one of the nodes in the sovereignty relationship*, not as a force with the capability of single-handedly reconstituting social processes in the political sphere" (ibid: 191, my emphasis).

Some (Venn, 2002: 123) suspect that because in the midst of the war on terrorism, 'power has rarely been so visible as now' 'theoreticians of decentrings' such as Hardt and Negri may be feeling uneasy about the plausibility of their positing a supra-national sovereign power along the diagram of the completion of the globalization of capital. But Hardt and Negri continue to defend the theory of emperialism, suggesting that (anti-) imperialists have failed to fully understand (or even notice) the much broader emperialism that even the United States government and military is subservient to. They see only the traditional half of the 'dual logic' behind the U.S.'s overtly imperialist ideologies and imperialist project in Iraq.

The war on Iraq 'has operated with a double justification. On one hand, it's been explained in what we would call traditionally imperialist terms - in terms of national economic interest: access to oil, strategic sites around the world, etc' (Hardt, *et al.*, 2002b: 63). There is though, 'a second logic, which we would call more [e]mperial logic. In other words, [military action in Iraq is] not in the national interests but in the global interest' (ibid). U.S. military organizations have these 'two roles that are not always coincident with each other' (ibid). Post-9/11 the U.S. army 'In some sense [is] the military of the United States as nation-state, but it's also the military arm of global power, of Empire' (ibid). There is, as there was in

Vietnam, currently 'a combination of imperialist and [e]mperial routes within the U.S. military itself' (ibid).

In short, the provocations of terrorists have set off what *looks like* a fight for universality between competing particularities - an inter-imperialist war - at the very moment when such a war is made futile by the emergence of a supra-national emperium which has already attained universal sovereignty. U.S. imperialists and their terrorist doubles seem to believe they can (maybe, that they should) oppose the tendency of empire to usurp their attempts to put themselves in the driving seat of global power. It is the premise (promise?) of Hardt and Negri's work that 'the decision of the sovereign can never negate the desire of the multitude' (Empire: 388). Their theory shows that of the two rivals - jihadism and U.S. imperialism - neither are capable of controlling the entire world of biopower.

THE MULTITUDE, COUNTER-EMPERIALISM AND CYBORG POLITICS

Hardt and Negri's account of the impossibility of imperialism and their alternative account of emperialism centres around what they know as "the constituent power of the multitude" or 'biopower from below' (*Empire's* inserts: 197). There is no need here for a full explication of this key counter-emperial concept[23]. It is enough simply to note that the theory of the multitude's constituent power - as the energy that runs the emperial machine - is to postmodernity what the theory of the proletariat as the motor of history was to modernity (this is *not* to say that the proletariat and the multitude are identical conceptual constructs). Empire 'pretends to be master of [the] world because it can destroy it. What a horrible illusion! In reality we are masters of the world because our desire and labour regenerate it continuously' (*Empire*: 388).

As we have seen, emperialism is the co-production of the life-world and the world of life and the subsumption of all objects/subjects into a single 'common machine'. However, *the*

multitude forces capital into these globalizing and cyborgizing processes. In this way, it is the multitude, not Empire, which constitutes and sustains the common machine. Within the process of the constitution of empire the multitude “acts as an absolutely positive force that pushes the dominating power toward an abstract and empty unification, to which it appears as a distinct alternative” (ibid: 62).

The confrontation of the multitude against the privatization of the commons continually forces capital elsewhere; ‘the history of capitalist forms is always necessarily a *reactive* history...capitalism undergoes systemic transformation only when it is forced to’ (ibid: 268 original emphasis). Empire’s political use of communal scientific knowledge and the directing of technological innovation toward its own sustenance is (hitherto) a successful defence mechanism against any and all attempts to desert the world of capital. Privatization of knowledge and the capitalist subsumption of the previously natural are effects of regulative control, not imperial ends in themselves; ‘in all cases the effectiveness of [e]mperial government is regulatory and not constituent’ (ibid: 360).

Biopower is the multitude’s co-operating bodies and brains, the ‘linguistic body’s’ capacity to sustain and enhance its life (Negri, 2003: 245). It points to the ineradicable possibility of the self-production of subjectivity. Imperial sovereignty is never anything but a reaction to this (cyborg) power, or a “rebound” of it (*Empire*: 360). Imperial production is entirely parasitic of the multitude, and is dependent on it.

“The multitude is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives only off the vitality of the multitude - as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living” (ibid: 62).

As a concept, the multitude is beautifully simple; it shines from the pages of *Empire*, its truth feels entirely obvious. The reality is messier, uglier, and complex. Away from Hardt

and Negri’s texts, away from the academics’ study, the multitude has a tendency to disappear behind the vast and constantly evolving capacity of empire to negate any and all imagination of possible post-imperial livable worlds. For those who would take political inspiration from Hardt and Negri’s theoretical ‘hypothesis’ (2001: 238), or imputation, of the multitude, every new story of repression, genocide and species extinction disheartens. Every advertisement and every image of greed or starvation mocks. Every multi-billion dollar profit report, every new patent issued and every corporate merger subdues. Every surveillance device, suicide bomb and cruise missile terrorizes. These realities of imperial life point toward the mastery of empire over the multitude, not the reverse. However, the difficulty of believing that Empire’s biopolitical power is always potentially subject to potential re-appropriation and reformation by the multitude does not remove the intuitive urgency of counter-imperialist (bio)political theory and organization.

Popular anti-imperialism directs organizational efforts away from the full generality of power in the postmodern world; ‘the mere refusal of order simply leaves us on the edge of nothingness - or worse, these gestures risk reinforcing imperial power rather than challenging it’ (*Empire*: 216-217). Worse yet, anti-imperialism, especially when founded on naïve anti-Americanism, has to be considered equivalent to jihadism in the (limited but significant) sense that its’ mode of action is a symbolic *refusal* of U.S. power, rather than the proposition of an alternative world order in which power is equally distributed and commonly regulated; ‘...refusal in itself is empty...What we need is to create a new social body...a project that goes well beyond refusal’ (ibid: 204).

Counter-imperialism is far more than anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism. It consists, at least partly, in the recognition that ‘technoscience is civics’ and that today’s biosciences play an important role in capitalism’s hijacking of our cyborg capacity to make some worlds rather than others (Haraway, 1997: 114).

The movement toward the practical constitution of post-emperial reality is beginning to get underway. Whether or not we choose to understand this as the revolutionary momentum - the constituent power - of the multitude does not much matter. What is necessary, in times of militarism and terrorism, is that we focus on developing theoretical and practical projects that globalize the experience of the desirability and possibility of future 'livable worlds' (ibid: 39). This means demonstrating that the ultimate form of power in the world is not violence - or even the symbolic violence that can give the appearance of power.

Nothing can be pre-planned or pre-determined, but it seems clear -whether we believe that it is Empire or the multitudes which have produced today's global society - that today's technologically-enabled globalization is a pre-requisite of a fully inclusive, radically cosmopolitan, post-emperialist society. At least part of the "anti-globalization" movement is in reality aware that capitalist globalization has a 'utopian element', which while has certainly 'never been unambiguous' (*Empire*: 115), is always worth pursuing[24]. There is an encouraging awareness throughout much of today's (increasingly global) popular culture that 'our political task...is not simply to resist [the processes of globalization] but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends', to imagine, create, and defend, 'an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges' (ibid: xv). There is also widespread awareness that the sciences and technologies (and individual scientists and technologists) of emperialism promise so much more than they are currently allowed to give. This awareness may well develop into the properly post-nationalist politics that Marx/Lenin would have wanted[25]. However, the socialism that proposes the nationalization of industries is exhausted. We are starting to imagine a socialism that proposes and achieves the *post-nationalization* of industries, perhaps beginning with those which immediately co-produce the social and ecological worlds - the bioscience industries. Such sentiments suggest one possible basis for a cyborg politics, *to-come* (Negri, 2003).

This imagination takes politics far from stiflingly under-ambitious anti-imperialist refusal, and very far indeed from terrorist sabotage.

For the present, bioscience and biotechnology industries must be recognized as one location (among many) of emperial cyborgization. They are sites of the appropriation of the cyborg powers of communicative cooperation, and of the appropriation of common technical (medical, agricultural, ecological) knowledge for private gain. Their territory extends far beyond the limited menu of continents that the old military and economic imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ate its way through.

The hybridization of capitalist (technological) and statist (political) power into a global sovereignty, parasitic of biopower, demands the development of a global cyborg politics adequate to the re-organization (re-appropriation) of the hi-tech machine we are all generating. There are no identifiable or self-confessed "emperialists" to protest in the streets against, or even to "rise up", against. There is though a common biopolitical society, permanently susceptible to re-constitution from below, at least partly via the re-organization of our 'social-technical alliances' (Haraway, 1997: 7). The interconnecting technologies of knowledge production, knowledge sharing and networked transmission make this cyborg politics possible for us in ways they were not for the Soviet's (too-)early attempts to form a global cosmopolitical organization.

Hardt and Negri's theory of emperialism is an explication of some of the possibilities for counter-emperialism, for a renewed era of enlightenment. It contains significant problems for American imperialists and anti-Americans alike. Imperialism should no longer be understood as simply the politically motivated expansion of economic and political influence over alien territory. We can now have a more hopeful understanding of such ideological phenomena as the *Project for the New American Century* and jihadism.

Counter-imperialism is more urgent and seeks to be more productive than narrow anti-imperialism. Those concerned with political organization must be encouraged that the revolutionary potentials of (tendentially) post-national life are little recognized in the parochial imperialism of contemporary U.S. government and military elites.

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NOTES

[1] See Hardt and Negri, 2000, for the full account, Brown, *et al.*, 2002, for previously unpublished outtakes from *Empire*, and two interviews, Negri, *et al.*, 2002 and Hardt, *et al.*, 2002. Sympathetic secondary works include Thoburn, 2001, Cox, 2001, and Mutman, 2001. Critical interventions in the debate on Empire and imperialism are Callinicos, 2002, Kraniauskas, 2000, and Levinson, 2001.

[2] Although Hardt and Negri do not themselves use the neologism "imperialist" I suggest that the term

can help to clearly demarcate the (modernist) pro- and anti-imperialists from Hardt and Negri's (postmodern) revision of the concept of Empire. Where Hardt and Negri write "the imperial" or "Empire", I have taken the liberty of emphasizing the difference between this and the traditional "imperialism" by writing "emperialism".

[3] Throughout I refer only to "U.S" forces and to a "U.S" war in Iraq. The vast majority of the nations that compose the "coalition forces" that repeatedly figure in military/political newspeak have in fact despatched only tiny, so-called "symbolic", forces to Iraq. This ideological linguistic manoeuvre is so widely recognized and criticized that my shorthand is hardly controversial. However, the size and media-prominence of U.K. (and arguably, Polish) armed forces make it just a little unfair. Readers who object to my critical shorthand on the grounds that symbolic military contributions are equally as valuable as human and technological ones are of course free to retain "coalition forces" and "the coalition's war" in Iraq.

[4] The Project advances a 'Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity' PNAC, 1997, and urges the Bush administration "to promote world peace through American strength" PNAC, 2000. These PNAC statements of intent clearly take delight in the mood of "resolve" in which they state their claim to world domination, and many of their writings have a significant amount of bluff and bluster about them. Of course, the teachings of extremists should always be handled with care, whether they are likely to be put to practical use or not. However, even if we concede that such monarchical ambitions do not necessarily tally with the ambitions of "the American people", their writings should not be hastily dismissed as unrepresentative of the American zeitgeist and therefore of no importance to anti-imperialist opinion or protestors. As a direct contradiction of the increasingly accepted thesis that no single nation-state dominates the landscape of international society, the writings of the PNAC should not be dismissed as the irrelevant indulgences of the power-drunk.

[5] For a concise account of globalization which emphasizes the ambiguity and multidimensionality of the process but remains open to the possibilities of an 'oppositional technopolitics', see Kellner, 2002. For an in-depth account Castells, 1996, remains relevant. For alternatives to capitalist globalization see Sklair, 2002. Each of these provides an excellent bibliography of relevant empirical and theoretical literature on globalization.

[6] Several of the sources I refer to throughout have been available to me only by internet and do not have fixed page numbers. Where this is the case I have not referenced page numbers in the conventional manner. Internet addresses for all sources cited without page numbers are given in the bibliography.

[7] As has been pointed out by John Newhouse, 2003,

p. 14-15, although imperialists are associated with the so-called "neo-conservatives" of the current Bush government, in the context of the tradition of Americans' election of centralist governments, they should surely be considered radical, not conservative.

[8] It should be noted that the imperialists believe that their policy will be the necessary one for any post-Bush U.S. administration; the 'Bush Doctrine...represents the realities of international politics in the post-cold-war, sole-superpower world...It is likely to remain the basis for U.S. security strategy for decades to come', Donnelly, 2003.

[9] Both pro- and anti imperialists locate the foundation of U.S. primacy in the cyborg character of its war machine. The U.S. army has an increasingly small human component and is becoming a stealthy, all-seeing machine. Modern armies are cyborg-armies: networks of machines of command, control, communication and destruction, Haraway, 1991; Hables-Gray, 1997. They are heavily reliant on post-industrial information technologies, most obviously the computer and the satellite, both products of war and cold war, Pickering, 1995. Satellite networks give the capacity not only to see, but to foresee, der Derian, 1997, p. 207. For this reason, both Clark and Kaplan allow for only one real threat to U.S. military hegemony: the development of an anti-satellite weapons system. The capacity to see and to hear globally, or the loss of that capacity to a pretender to the US throne, is seen as the gauge of America's military status. The only realistic threat to this techno-power is considered to be more of the same: stealthier and deadlier cyborgs.

[10] see The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003.

[11] Heikal, 1992, is an excellent anti-imperialist history of the events before and during the 1991 Gulf War. Tripp, 2002, is one of the few general histories of the tyrannies of both colonial- and Saddam Hussein-era Iraq. When experts on the U.S. military report that 'the very distinction between our civilian and military operations overseas is eroding... our diplomats, particularly our ambassadors, are acting more like generals', Kaplan, 2003, then Tripp's history of Iraq should be read as a warning of what happens when military and political institutions become indistinct. That is, tyrannical government. We should not neglect the possibility that the Americanization of Iraq will also be the Iraqification of the U.S.

[12] Mahajan, 2003, p. 111-117 discusses the recent conflation of the doctrine of the right to pre-emption - which means the right to invade a country when it poses a direct threat - and the doctrine of the right to preventative war - the so-called "Bush Doctrine" - which, in Donnelly's rhetoric, means "don't even think about it!". Donnelly, 2003, engages in this conflation when he notes that the doctrine 'rests in part on a logic of preemption that underlies the logic of [U.S] primacy'.

[13] This attitude was perhaps most memorably displayed by veteran “hawk” Donald Rumsfeld, whose aide was reportedly instructed to “Go massive...sweep it all up, things related and not” when researching the links between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, Clark, 2003, p. 118. However, despite surveys showing that more than half of Americans believed Iraq was responsible for the attacks of 9/11 at the start of the invasion, Newhouse, 2003, p. 70, it now seems that intelligence and military agencies knew at that time that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were ideological enemies and that any alliance between them was entirely spurious, Clark, 2003, p. 113-114; Simons, 2002, p. 35-37.

[14] Kaplan, Donnelly and D’Souza all defend even the most controversial U.S. interventions as always having left their protectorates better off than they previously were.

[15] This comment displays the same misplaced righteousness with which the nineteenth and early twentieth century political philosophers and politicians simultaneously advanced the cause of political enlightenment in the home nations and denied that the colonies were “ready” for self-government. On how this foundational logic of European imperialism was manifest in both bourgeois and socialist political philosophy, see, e.g., Chakrabarty, 2000.

[16] Justifications for the war by imperialists do indeed follow what Hardt calls a ‘dual logic’ - the war was alternately justified by imperialist and imperial logic. The contradictions of this double justification are discussed further below.

[17] General Clark’s definition of “modern war” is actually very close to Chris Hables Gray’s, 1997, definition of “postmodern war”; heavily reliant on continuous technological revolution within the military, intended to cause relatively few civilian casualties and productive of spectacular images of war, beamed live globally. However, Clark attempts to de-cyborgize the U.S. army by insisting that it was the skill and bravery of U.S. soldiers, rather than the computerized surveillance and weapons network in which they were operating, that won the recent war in Iraq.

[18] When citing Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, 2002, below I reference simply “*Empire*”. When citing material which was in the original manuscript for *Empire* but which was cut for lack of space - the so-called “inserts” - Brown, *et al.*, 2002, I reference simply “*Empire’s inserts*”.

[19] Hardt and Negri pre-empt the obvious criticism that many nations have democratic government, and thus cannot be said to live under the rule of a supranational imperial authority, by reminding us that the devastating power of nuclear technology, has ‘taken away the power to make decisions over war and peace, which is a primary element of the traditional definition of sovereignty’ (*Empire*: 345). Obviously, this

applies to the U.S. too. There are many similar examples of the socio-political effects of border-crossing technology to support the theory of imperialism and the case for a counter-imperialist cyborg politics.

[20] Returning to the example of the war on Iraq, despite the widely held view among mainstream anti-imperialists that the U.S. and U.K. invaded Iraq primarily “for the oil”, it is clear to me that the U.S. did not need to invade Iraq in order to exploit its oil reserves. For example, the U.S. has exerted considerable economic and political pressure in the pursuit of secure oil reserves in non-Middle East oil-producing nations such as Venezuela and Nigeria, with considerable success. As Mahajan notes ‘oil is bought and sold on the world market’ and so ‘the source of the oil is largely unimportant’, 2003, p. 168. Of course, oil will be vital to any U.S. imperialist project but it seems certain that the oil industry’s representatives in the Whitehouse are knowledgeable enough to know that there are quieter and cheaper ways to control the oil market than launching full scale imperialist invasions.

[21] Pages 309-314 and 317-319 of *Empire* contain the key passages on this ‘hybrid constitution’. An anti-capitalist project called the ‘Tangential University’ provide partial “maps” of the networks that connect a wide variety of the institutions in the imperial constitution, see <http://utangente.free.fr/index2.html>, but with their quasi-anarchic slogan ‘Refuse the Biopolice!’, they remain anti-imperialist rather than counter-imperialist.

[22] Fuller, 2001, provides a thought-provoking discussion of the opposed theories of Fukuyama and Huntington and their respective implications for sociological analysis post-9/11.

[23] Two constructively critical explications of the concept are Ansaldi, 2001, and Read, 2001. The former questions why Hardt and Negri do not speak of the multitudes, plural. This seems to be an excellent point, given that their revision/expansion of “proletariat” as a social category is intended to move political organization away from homogenous Parties. However, because such a plural category would still imply a shared position of subalterneity I retain the multitude, singular. See also Negri, 2003, and of course, *Empire*.

[24] Hardt summarizes the two tendencies within the inaccurately named “anti-globalization” movement: ‘The first poses neoliberalism as the primary analytical category, viewing the enemy as unrestricted global capitalist activity with weak state controls: the second is more clearly posed against capital itself, whether state-regulated or not’, Hardt, 2002, p. 114.

[25] Of course, awareness of the need for social-technical-political change is no guarantee of any liberation movements’ success.

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