The aim of this paper is to present the issue of judicial freedom of expression in the perspective of obligations that are inherent in the judicial role. The fulfilment of such a task is dictated firstly by the presentation of an epistemic and egalitarian view of judicial humility. Based on this distinction I hypothesise two directions of thinking about judicial freedom of expression. The epistemic variant, focusing on the role aspect, presents the judge as a special category of citizen due to the obligations connected with his or her profession. The egalitarian variant presents an image of the judge as a citizen. The whole study is completed by the justification of the choice of a research topic. Among the reasons, technological changes and the related development of social media deserve special attention. The implementation of the tasks mentioned above allows several conclusions to be drawn. One of them concerns the mentioned hypothesis, which is given a correction. The other conclusion, in turn, concerns the variables in view of which the scope of judicial freedom of expression can be examined. The first of these is the sphere in which the judge’s expression occurs, the second is the object of that expression, and the third variable is the cultural aspect.