Publikacja:

Judicial Authority – Fundamental Dilemmas

Data

2024
Artykuł
w:Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem
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Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem
Rocznik 2024Wydanie 4Numer 16
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Autorzy

Andrzej Gomułowicz Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan

Czasopismo

Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem

Cytowanie

Andrzej Gomułowicz. (2024). Judicial Authority – Fundamental Dilemmas. Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia Nad Prawem, 16(4), 161–175. https://doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.726

Słowa kluczowe

principle of legalism principle of the rule of law significance of the antinomy of legal rules (dura lex sed lex summum ius summa iniuria) judicial activism judicial independence significance of the principle of aequitas

Abstrakt

One of the fundamental dilemmas in judicial application of the law is to respect the principle of the rule of law and not only the principle of legalism. The principle of legalism as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution insufficiently protects the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual, and therefore judicial activism is required, i.e. a correction of the established law in the process of interpretation and application of the law in order to give the law such content that is consistent with the constitutionally defined values underlying the axiology of the Polish Constitution. The correction of the legislated law involves going beyond the content of the principle of legalism and referring to such values as – equity, justice, goodness, human rights and freedoms. The judge, due to the fact that under the Constitution he is first and foremost subject to its provisions, and secondarily to the laws, may – if he is able to justify it – reject the content of the statutory provisions and base his decision exclusively on the provisions of the Constitution. This is justified when the Constitution protects individual rights and freedoms to a greater extent than the law. A judge may not invoke the rule dura lex sed lex in the process of interpretation, as it destroys the standards of legal culture. The correction of statute law in the process of its inter-pretation relates to judicial independence and responsibility for the issued decision.

Statystyki

10 od daty umieszczenia 2025-07-25
6ostatni miesiąc
6ostatni tydzień
Data pozyskania: 2026-02-27
11 od daty umieszczenia 2025-07-25
1ostatni miesiąc
Data pozyskania: 2026-02-27

Statystyki

10 od daty umieszczenia 2025-07-25
6ostatni miesiąc
6ostatni tydzień
Data pozyskania: 2026-02-27
11 od daty umieszczenia 2025-07-25
1ostatni miesiąc
Data pozyskania: 2026-02-27