Reciprocity and Generalized Reciprocity: How Unfairness Affects Allocations in First and Second Interactions with Wrongdoers and Uninvolved Parties

Abstract

Most research on unfairness responses examines the first decision after a norm violation. We studied behavior across two interactions in a two-stage game (N = 680). Participants received an unfair offer, then allocated money to either the same person (the wrongdoer) or a new, uninvolved person. Later, they made a second allocation to the wrongdoer or another stranger. Participants gave less to wrongdoers than to new partners, especially if they had not previously had the opportunity to retaliate. When they had such an opportunity, this effect diminished. These findings suggest that direct retaliation may reduce punitive motivation, whereas generalized responses do not. The study clarifies how fairness concerns and reciprocity unfold across interactions and highlights the limits of displaced responses ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The publisher has provided a temporary link allowing free download of the published version (Version of Record). The link is limited to 50 downloads; once the limit is reached, access may require a subscription. https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5MCEA9ZIHCPURMDHP2EI/full?target=10.1080/01973533.2025.2572630