Vulnerability of Selected Social Choice Methods to Strategic Voting

cris.legacyid	3892
cris.virtual.journalance	#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalance	c5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.pl	Analysis of vulnerability of selected social choice methods to strategic voting is presented in the article. Selected methods are: plurality voting, the Borda count and approval voting. Applied procedure allowed strategic voting of unlimited number of voters. With each method voters knew the outcome of the sincere voting, consistent with their real preferences. 24 variants differed on voting parameters; for each variant 1000 random profiles of preferences have been analyzed. Results are different from expected.
dc.contributor.affiliation	Microsoft
dc.contributor.author	Piotr Pysiak
dc.date.accessioned	2025-07-28T14:21:01Z
dc.date.available	2025-07-28T14:21:01Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.date.published	2014-04-08
dc.description.issue	6
dc.description.physical	45 58
dc.identifier.issn	1733-0092
dc.identifier.uri	https://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3435
dc.language	en
dc.relation.ispartof	Collective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages	45 58
dc.rights	CC-BY-4.0
dc.subject	metody wyboru społecznego
dc.subject	metoda większości pierwszeństwa
dc.subject	metoda bordy
dc.subject	metoda aprobująca
dc.subject	głosowanie szczere
dc.subject	głosowanie strategiczne
dc.subject	symulacja komputerowa
dc.title	Vulnerability of Selected Social Choice Methods to Strategic Voting
dc.type	Article
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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