Publikacja:

Schelling games, Kuran dominos and electoral coalitions. Non-standard game-theoretic models of collective action

Data

2015
Artykuł
Przeszukaj czasopismo Uproszczony widok Pełne metadane Statystyki
 
cris.legacyid5968
cris.virtual.journalance#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalancec5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.plNon-cooperative games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and others are primary tools used for modeling collective action. I consider formal models that are close cousins of such standard games: Schelling’s games, Kuran’s dominos and partition function form games. For certain empirical problems, each of these formalisms may have advantages over standard games. Among the benefi ts there are mathematical simplicity, more intuitive depiction of represented phenomena, and better operationalizability. I formalize all three models and prove simple existence theorems for two of them. The detailed examples of applications include vaccination, unpredictability of revolutions, and electoral coalitions.
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of California
dc.contributor.authorMarek Kaminski
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-28T14:25:47Z
dc.date.available2025-07-28T14:25:47Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.date.published12/2014
dc.description.issue24
dc.description.physical91-105
dc.identifier.doi10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.62
dc.identifier.issn1733-0092
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3669
dc.languageen
dc.relation.ispartofCollective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages91-105
dc.rightsCC-BY-4.0
dc.subjectcollective action
dc.subjectnon-cooperative games
dc.subjectpartition function
dc.subjectschelling’s games
dc.subjectkuran’s games
dc.subjectmancur olson
dc.subtypeOriginal
dc.title

Schelling games, Kuran dominos and electoral coalitions. Non-standard game-theoretic models of collective action

dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication