Publikacja:

Greed and Fear in Downstream R&D Games

Data

2019
Artykuł
 
cris.legacyid5799
cris.virtual.journalance#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalancec5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.plThe aim of this paper is to investigate the fi rms’ incentives to engage in process R&D under vertical industrial setting, when the raising rivals’ cost effect is present. We show that R&D investment of the downstream duopoly fi rm raises the rival’s marginal costs of production. The downstream R&D behavior can give rise to the symmetric investment games, i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma, the deadlock game and the harmony game, between downstream competitors. If the costs of the R&D investments made by the downstream fi rms are large enough, the downstream fi rms can participate in the harmony game, which results in the investment hold-up or the creation of the R&D-avoiding cartel. For more R&D-effi cient downstream fi rms, the downstream investment game can end up in the prisoner’s dilemma or the deadlock game. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, but such a behavior is not Pareto optimal. In the prisoner’s dilemma, greed and fear make fi rms invest in R&D. In the deadlock game, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, and such a behavior is Pareto optimal. The R&D investments are not induced by any social tension (greed or fear).
dc.contributor.affiliationWarsaw School of Economics
dc.contributor.authorAdam Karboowski
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-28T14:24:53Z
dc.date.available2025-07-28T14:24:53Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.date.published12/2019
dc.description.issue32
dc.description.physical63-76
dc.identifier.doi10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.131
dc.identifier.issn1733-0092
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3627
dc.languageen
dc.relation.ispartofCollective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages63-76
dc.rightsCC-BY-4.0
dc.subjectbadania i rozwój
dc.subjectinwestycje
dc.subjectdylemat więźnia
dc.subjectzakleszczenie
dc.subjectharmonia
dc.subtypeOriginal
dc.title

Greed and Fear in Downstream R&D Games

dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication