Publikacja:

Paradoxes of liberalism and federalism

Data

2007
Artykuł
 
cris.legacyid3901
cris.virtual.journalance#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalancec5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.plAn indispensable feature of a federation is autonomy of the parts of the federation. Federation systems differ in a degree of autonomy. Respecting group rights in social decision-making in federations can be in conflict with the Pareto optimality principle. It is the essence of the so-called federal paradox. The paradox of federalism, unlike the liberal paradox, i.e., a similar potential inconsistency between respecting individual rights and the efficiency of social decisions, has not yet been fully analyzed. In this paper, after presentation of the liberal paradox, well described in the literature, we present a formal characterization of the federal paradox. Moreover, some other problems connected to decision-making in federations are discussed.
dc.contributor.affiliationInstytut Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
dc.contributor.authorGrzegorz Lissowski
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-28T14:21:10Z
dc.date.available2025-07-28T14:21:10Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.date.published2014-04-08
dc.description.issue7
dc.description.physical5 27
dc.identifier.issn1733-0092
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3444
dc.languageen
dc.relation.ispartofCollective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages5 27
dc.rightsCC-BY-4.0
dc.subjectparadoks liberalizmu
dc.subjectparadoks federalizmu
dc.subjectzasada optymalności pareto
dc.subjectmetody wyboru społecznego
dc.title

Paradoxes of liberalism and federalism

dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication