Publikacja:

Models and features of symmetric auctions

Data

2006
Artykuł
 
cris.legacyid3894
cris.virtual.journalance#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalancec5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.plAuction theory belongs to one of the most important applications of game theory in economics. The possibility of presenting an auction as a game facilitates its strategic analysis and the comparison of different auction rules in relation to the player`s expected payoffs. The aim of this paper is to review basic knowledge concerning symmetric auctions for which we assume that all bidders possess the same amount of information concerning sold objects and all bidders` valuations are independent as well as identically distributed random variables. The first part of this paper is devoted to unit object auctions. We will present strategic analysis of the family of such auctions within the model proposed by Riley and Samuelson (1981). The second part of the thesis will be devoted to the description of different types of multiple object auctions: the simultaneous ascending auction and the Anglo-Dutch auction which have been created to sell telecommunication licenses, the combinatorial auction, during which buyers receive the possibility to place their offers on sets of items, and finally the double auction in which many buyers and sellers participate.
dc.contributor.affiliationZakład Zarządzania Przedsiębiorstwem Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa im.Papieża Jana Pawła II w Białej Podlaskiej
dc.contributor.authorAgnieszka Lewczuk
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-28T14:21:03Z
dc.date.available2025-07-28T14:21:03Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.date.published2014-04-08
dc.description.issue6
dc.description.physical81 106
dc.identifier.issn1733-0092
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3437
dc.languageen
dc.relation.ispartofCollective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages81 106
dc.subjectaukcja jednoobiektowa
dc.subjectaukcja wieloobiektowa
dc.subjectrozkład wycen
dc.subjectoczekiwany dochód sprzedawcy
dc.title

Models and features of symmetric auctions

dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication