Publikacja:

Evolutionary stability of discriminating social norms

Data

2016
Artykuł
Przeszukaj czasopismo Uproszczony widok Pełne metadane Statystyki
 
cris.legacyid5928
cris.virtual.journalance#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.journalancec5e604c2-f6bd-4f19-914c-e01c8ff3c6c3
dc.abstract.plThe paper presents an evolutionary model illustrating the dynamics that give rise to discriminatory social norms i.e. such rules of behaviour that fulfi l two conditions: (1) they treat differently actors having the same abilities and technical options, but differing in some arbitrary sense (2) they are supported by socially enforced sanctions. In the presented model both discrimination and social norms are necessary to solve a coordination problem that arises when the situation requires different actors to perform different tasks. The properties of behavioural rules relying on discrimination and leading to various degrees of inequality are analysed. It is demonstrated that in general norms ensuring equal payoffs are easier to stabilize, but unfair norms can also be stable.
dc.contributor.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorKatarzyna Abramczuk
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-28T14:25:03Z
dc.date.available2025-07-28T14:25:03Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.date.published6/2016
dc.description.issue26
dc.description.physical27-57
dc.identifier.doi10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.77
dc.identifier.issn1733-0092
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.kozminski.edu.pl/handle/item/3635
dc.languageen
dc.relation.ispartofCollective and Individual Decisions
dc.relation.pages27-57
dc.rightsCC-BY-4.0
dc.subjectteaoria gier
dc.subjectsankcje społeczne
dc.subjectnormy społeczne
dc.subjectkontrola społeczna
dc.subjectdyskryminacja
dc.subjectpowstawanie przywilejów
dc.subjectnierówności społeczne
dc.subtypeOriginal
dc.title

Evolutionary stability of discriminating social norms

dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication